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SCIENCE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE SACRED TEXT:
PALEONTOLOGICAL RESOURCES AND NATIVE
AMERICAN RIGHTS
ALLISON M. DussIAs*
Land is the only thing in the world that amounts to anything... for
'tis the only thing in this world that lasts. ... 'Tis the only thing
worth working for, worth fighting for-worth dying for.' -Gone
with the Wind
You have driven away our game and our means of livelihood out of
the country, until now we have nothing left that is valuable except
the hills that you ask us to give up.... The earth is full of minerals
of all kinds, and on the earth the ground is covered with forests of
heavy pine, and when we give these up to the Great Father we know
that we give up the last thing that is valuable either to us or the white
people.2  -Wanigi Ska (White Ghost)
We believe that at the beginning of all things, when the earth was
young, the thunderbirds were giants. . . They fought with
unktegila, the great water monster ... You can find the bones of
unktegila in the Badlands mixed with the remains of petrified sea
shells and turtles.3  -John (Fire) Lame Deer
* Associate Professor of Law, New England School of Law; BA., Georgetown Univer-
sity;J.D., University of Michigan. The author is grateful to the Board of Trustees and Dean
of New England School of Law for the summer research stipend that made this Article
possible, and to Govind Sreenivasan and the participants in a March 1995 faculty workshop
at New England School of Law for their comments on earlier drafts of this Article. This
Article is dedicated to the memory of my grandmother, Dickeybelle Wesner Napier, with
gratitude for her love and support.
1. MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND 36 (1936). This statement was made by
Gerald O'Hara, an Irish immigrant, to his daughter Scarlett O'Hara, in response to her
expression of disdain for Tara, the family estate. Gerald went on to make a statement that
also describes the traditional attitude of Native Americans toward the land: "[T ] o anyone
with a drop of Irish blood in them the land they live on is like their mother." Id.; see also
infra notes 98-113 and accompanying text (discussing Native American attitudes toward the
land).
2. DEE BROWN, BURY My HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE: AN INDIAN HISTORY OF THE AMERI-
CAN WEST 275 (1970).
3. JOHN (FIRE) LAME DEER & RICHARD ERDoES, LAME DEER, SEEKER OF VISIONS 251-52
(1994). Lame Deer, a Lakota Sioux medicine man, devoted his life to preserving the cul-
ture and history of Native Americans. See Ruth Rosenberg, Introduction to LAME DEER &
ERtOEs at ix-xi.
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In 1993, in Black Hills Institute of Geological Research v. South Dakota
School of Mines and Technology,4 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held that the United States, rather than the Black Hills Insti-
tute of Geological Research (BHIGR), had title to a valuable Tyranno-
saurus rex fossil that BHIGR had excavated on the Cheyenne River
Sioux Reservation in South Dakota.' The United States held the land
on which the fossil was found in trust for an individual Indian.6
BHIGR had paid the Indian rancher for the right to excavate the fos-
sil, but had neither sought nor received the approval of the Secretary
of the Interior or the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe for the excavation. 7
In deciding that BHIGR had not acquired title to the fossil, the court
of appeals reasoned that the fossil was land before it was excavated,
and, therefore, was subject to a federal statutory provision prohibiting
the transfer of Indian trust lands without prior federal approval.8
Some commentators have criticized the court of appeals's deci-
sion for its potential impact on fossil collecting on federal lands and
have expressed concern over the due process implications of the gov-
ernment's seizure of the fossil.9 One commentator has viewed the de-
cision as an indication of the problems inherent in the survival of
4. 12 F.3d 737 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denie, 115 S. Ct. 61 (1994). The discovery of the
Tyrannosaurus rex fossil resulted in four reported federal court decisions: Black Hills Inst.
of Geological Research v. United States Dep't of Justice, 967 F.2d 1237 (8th Cir. 1992)
[hereinafter Black Hills 1] (remanding to the district court to determine whether tempo-
rary custody of the fossil during pendency of the case should remain with the federal gov-
ernment or be returned to the Institute); Black Hills Inst. of Geological Research v. United
States Dep't ofJustice, 978 F.2d 1043 (8th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Black Hills I1] (affirming
the district court's decision to name the South Dakota School of Mines and Technology as
custodian of the fossil pendente lite); Black Hills Inst. of Geological Research v. United
States Dep't ofJustice, 812 F. Supp. 1015 (D.S.D. 1993) [hereinafter Black Hills III] (hold-
ing that the embedded fossil was an interest in land held in trust for the Indian beneficial
owner, and failure of the Indian owner to apply for approval from the federal government
rendered the sale null and void), af/'d in part, rev'd in part sub noan. Black Hills Inst. of
Geological Research v. South Dakota Sch. of Mines and Technology, 12 F.3d 737 (8th Cir.
1993) [hereinafter Black Hills I] (affirming that the United States holds trust tide to the
fossil), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 61 (1994). For a discussion of Black Hills IV, see infra notes 56-
74 and accompanying text.
5. Black Hills IV, 12 F.3d at 737.
6. Id. at 744. In this Article, both the terms "Native American" and "Indian" are used
to refer in general to the descendants of the indigenous peoples of North America. Tribal
designations are used wherever possible.
7. Id. at 739-40.
8. Id. at 74143.
9. See Patrick K. Duffy & Lois A. Lofgren, Jurassic Farce: A Critical Analysis of the Govern-
ment's Seizure of "Sue," A Sixty-Five-Million-Year-Old Tyrannosaurus Rex Fossil, 39 S.D. L. REV.
478 (1994). Patrick Duffy was one of BHIGR's lawyers in the dispute. Black Hills 1V, 12
F.3d at 739. 1"
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restrictions on the transfer of Indian trust lands. 10 Still another has
focused on the decision as an indication of the need for comprehen-
sive federal regulation of paleontological resources." These com-
mentators have not, however, examined the appropriate tribal role in
regulating paleontological resources found on reservation lands and
the implications of the Black Hills case for tribal sovereignty. 2 Nor
have these commentators considered how decision-makers, in ad-
dressing issues related to fossils found on reservation lands, should
weigh the import of Native American attitudes toward the land and
fossils and the history of fossil collecting on tribal lands.
This Article examines the role that tribes should play in the regu-
lation of paleontological resources found on reservation lands. Part I
reviews the discovery and excavation of the Tyrannosaurus rex fossil
considered in the Black Hills case and the federal court decisions on
ownership of the fossil. Part II discusses traditional Native American
thought about the sacred nature of the land and the fossils therein.
Part III examines the history of encounters between Native Americans
and paleontologists during the nineteenth century, demonstrating
that the Black Hills case is only the most recent incident in a long
history of the taking of fossils from reservation lands without tribal
consent. Drawing upon the religious and historical discussions in
Parts II and III, Part IV analyzes the issue of tribal regulation of pale-
ontological resources on reservation lands. Part IV first considers re-
tained tribal sovereignty and treaty rights as possible foundations for
tribal regulatory authority. Part IV then examines federal legislation
as a means of guaranteeing a tribal role in the regulation of paleonto-
logical resources. The Conclusion returns to the Black Hills case and
discusses the appropriate tribal role in the regulation of paleontologi-
cal resources on reservation lands.
I. THE BLACK HitLLs DECISIONS
The excavation and removal of a valuable Tyrannosaurus rex fos-
sil from Indian trust land on the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation
resulted in four reported federal court decisions addressing custody
10. See Mark D. Poindexter, Of Dinosaurs and Indefinite Land Trusts: A Review of Individ-
ual American Indian Property Rights Amidst the Legacy of Allotment, 14 B.C. THIRD WoRLD L.J.
53, 78-81 (1994).
11. See DavidJ. Lazerwitz, Note, Bones of Contention: The Regulation of Paleontological Re-
sources on the Federal Public Lands, 69 IND. L.J. 601, 603 (1994).
12. The article by Patrick Duffy and Lois Lofgren does briefly discuss the issues of tribal
sovereignty and tribal regulation, but these issues are not the main focus of the article.
Duffy & Lofgren, supra note 9, at 498-500.
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and ownership of the fossil.'" In determining ownership of the fossil,
the district court and the court of appeals relied on federal statutes
relating to Indian trust land and on state law definitions of land. 4
Absent from this analysis was consideration of the traditional Native
American understanding of the nature of land and the fossils and
other materials that compose it,"' even though the fossil was found on
reservation land. Moreover, the courts disregarded the possible inter-
ests or authority of the tribe from whose reservation, and without
whose knowledge, the fossil was removed. 6 Finally, the opinions
failed to recognize that the excavation and removal of the fossil are
simply the most recent example of paleontologists' historic failure to
respect tribal sovereignty and interests in paleontological resources on
reservation lands.1 7
A. The Discovery
In August 1990 during a break from an excavation at another
BHIGR site, amateur paleontologist and BHIGR employee Sue Hen-
drickson came across the fossilized remains of a Tyrannosaurus rex' s
13. See supra note 4. The incident also led to civil proceedings in tribal court during
which the tribe sought forfeiture of the fossil because BHIGR had not purchased a tribal
business license. Duffy & Lofgren, supra note 9, at 507; see also Tribe Loses Round in Fight
OverDinosaur Named Sue, RoGcy MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver),July 15, 1994, at 23A (reporting
that a tribal judge had held that the forfeiture provision of the business license ordinance
was inapplicable because it had been adopted after removal of the fossil). In addition, the
federal government indicted BHIGR, several of its officers, and other fossil dealers, for 39
crimes ranging from currency violations to theft of government property. In re Larson, 43
F.3d 410, 411 (8th Cir. 1994). In March 1995 the jury in the criminal proceedings either
acquitted or failed to reach a verdict on all but eight of the charges against the defendants.
Malcolm W. Browne, U.S. Dealt Setback in Effort to Curb Dinosaur Fossil Hunters, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 17, 1995, at A21 [hereinafter U.S. Dealt Setback].
14. See infra notes 35-51, 57-66 and accompanying text.
15. See infra part H (discussing Native American attitudes toward the land, stones, and
fossils).
16. See infra part IVA (discussing the scope of tribal regulatory authority).
17. See infra part III (describing the history of paleontologists' activities on Native
American lands).
18. The Tyrannosaurus rex has captured the public imagination, resulting in a number
of books aimed at dinosaur enthusiasts. See, e.g., JOHN R. HORNER & DON LESSEM, THE
COMPLETE T. REx: How STUNNING NEW DiscovR uEs ARE CHANGING OUR UNDERSTANDING
OF THE WORLD'S MOST FAMOUS DINOSAUR (1993). The Tyrannosaurus rex lived 65 to 67
million years ago. Id. at 18. Its remains have been found in Montana, Wyoming, Colorado,
South Dakota, and Alberta, Canada. Id. at 25. Although the Tyrannosaurus rex has be-
come one of the best known dinosaurs, the fossil discovered on Maurice Williams's ranch
was only the eleventh Tyrannosaurus rex discovered by paleontologists. Id. at 64-65
(describing the 11 specimens that had been found). Several additional specimens have
since been discovered. Id. at 73-75; see also Malcolm W. Browne, Dinosaur Institute Keeps
Digging, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1993, at C6 [hereinafter Dinosaur Institute Keeps Digging] (not-
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on Maurice Williams's ranch on the Cheyenne River Sioux Reserva-
tion in western South Dakota.19 Maurice Williams is a member of the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe,2" and the ranch was located on land
held in trust by the United States for Williams's benefit." The fossil,
the largest and most complete Tyrannosaurus rex ever found, 22 was
named "Sue."23 After BHIGR, a commercial fossil dealer,2 4 had be-
gun excavation of the fossil, it issued a $5000 check to Williams, alleg-
edly for title to the fossil and the right to excavate it.25 After removing
the fossil from Williams's ranch, without the knowledge or consent of
any federal agency,2 6 BHIGR moved the ten tons of bones from the
reservation to Hill City, South Dakota, for restoration.27 Tribal offi-
cials were unaware of BHIGR's activities until the fossil had been re-
ing BHIGR's discovery of two additional Tyrannosaurus rex fossils named "Stan" and
"Duffy")
19. Black Hills , 967 F.2d 1237, 1238-39 (8th Cir. 1992). Portions of the fossil were
protruding from beneath the surface of the earth. Black Hills HI, 812 F. Supp. 1015, 1017
(D.S.D. 1993). The Black Hills I opinion identifies Sue Hendrickson as the discoverer of
the fossil. 967 F.2d at 1238. One newspaper article, however, reported that Peter Larson,
president of BHIGR, credited Maurice Williams with the discovery. Malcolm W. Browne,
F.B.L Seizes Tyrannosaur in Fight on Fossil Custody, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1992, at Al [hereinaf-
ter F.B.I. Seizes Tyrannosaur in Fight on Fossil Custody]. BHIGR's nearby site, referred to as
the Ruth Mason Dinosaur Quarry, contains the remains of over 10,000 duck-billed dino-
saurs, a number of which have been excavated by BHIGR and sold abroad. Judy Pasternak,
Monstrous Bones of Contention; The Best Tyrannosaurus Rex Skeleton in History Has Been Discov-
ered. But Do the Activities of Private Fossil Hunters Like Those Who Found "Sue" Serve the Interests
of Science?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1992, at Al.
20. F.B.L Seizes Tyrannosaur in Fight on Fossil Custody, supra note 19, at Al.
21. Black Hills I, 967 F.2d at 1239. For a discussion of the trust status of the land, see
infra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
22. Black Hills I, 967 F.2d at 1239. The fossil was more than 90% complete. HORNER &
LEssEM, supra note 18, at 72. The femur alone measured 54 inches. Id. at 71. For photo-
graphs of the fossil before removal from the reservation, see id. at 70-71, 74-75.
23. Black Hills I, 967 F.2d at 1238 n.2. Given the location at which it was found-the
Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation-the fossil might more aptly have been named "Sioux"
rather than its homophone, "Sue."
24. For a discussion of the debate over the role of commercial fossil dealers in fossil
collecting, see Malcolm W. Browne, A Dinosaur Named Sue Divides Fossil Hunters, N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 1992, at Cl [hereinafter A Dinosaur Named Sue Divides Fossil Hunters].
25. Black Hills III, 812 F. Supp. 1015, 1017 (D.S.D. 1993). Maurice Williams later main-
tained that the check was given in compensation for damage to the land, not for the fossil
itself. Pasternak, supra note 19, at Al. According to paleontologists, a fossil like the one
found on Williams's ranch could be sold for several million dollars, particularly if sold to a
foreign museum. F.B.L Seizes Tyrannosaur in Fight on Fossil Custody, supra note 19, at Al; see
also U.S. Dealt Setback, supra note 13, at A21.
26. Black Hills I, 812 F. Supp. at 1017.
27. Black Hills IV, 12 F.3d 737, 739 (8th Cir. 1993).
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moved from the reservation, when the discovery was reported in a
Rapid City, South Dakota, newspaper.2
B. The Seizure
In May 1992 dozens of Federal Bureau of Investigation agents,
Park Rangers, and members of the South Dakota National Guard, act-
ing on the orders of the United States Attorney for South Dakota,
seized the fossil from BHIGR's offices in a much-publicized early
morning raid.29 The federal government alleged that BHIGR's exca-
vation and removal of the fossil violated the Antiquities Act of 1906.30
Following the seizure, BHIGR filed suit in federal district court to
quiet title to the fossil31 and unsuccessfully sought a preliminary in-
junction requiring the return of the fossil.3 2 The Cheyenne River
28. Alison Frankel, Tyrannosaurus Lem, AM. LAw., Dec. 1992, at 45. A tribal official later
noted that BHIGR did not make any press announcement until it had removed the fossil
from the reservation. Pasternak, supra note 19, at Al. In October 1990 the tribe passed a
resolution claiming ownership of Sue. Frankel, supra, at 45.
29. Black Hills I, 967 F.2d 1237, 1239 (8th Cir. 1992). The seizure was reported in many
newspapers and journals in the United States and abroad. See, e.g., F.B.I. Seizes Tyrannosaur
in Fight on Fossil Custody, supra note 19, at Al; FBI Seizes Dinosaur Skeleton, CHRISTIAN Sci.
MONITOR, May 20, 1992, at 8; Federal Agents Seize Dinosaur Bones, WASH. TIMES, May 15, 1992,
at A6; Martin Fletcher, FBI Raiders Seize a Dinosaur Called Sue, THE TIMES (London), May 20,
1992, at 10; Frankel, supra note 28, at 45; Giant Dinosaur Bones Seized by U.S. in Dispute, CHI.
TRIB., May 20, 1992, at 15; Martin Walker, T-Rex Bones Held in Federal Vault as Sioux Sue for
Sue, THE GUARDIAN (London), May 20, 1992, at 11.
30. Black Hills 1, 967 F.2d at 1239 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 433 (1988)). The Antiquities Act
provides for penalties of a $500 fine and 90 days in jail for removal of any object of antiq-
uity from federal land without government permission. 16 U.S.C. § 433 (1988); see also
infra note 286 (discussing the application of the Antiquities Act in case law). The U.S.
Attorney also alleged that BHIGR committed the felonies of stealing from both govern-
ment and tribal trust lands. Frankel, supra note 28, at 45. See also Duffy & Lofgren, supra
note 9, at 482 & nn.28-29 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1988) and 18 U.S.C. § 1163 (1988)).
BHIGR had also excavated fossils on tribal trust land that the tribe had leased to Maurice
Williams's brother. Frankel, supra note 28, at 45.
31. BHIGR's original complaint sought to quiet title to the fossil under the Federal
Quiet Title Act. Black Hills II, 812 F. Supp. at 1018. The Quiet Title Act, however, does
not apply to "trust or restricted Indian lands." Id. at 1018 n.4 (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2409a(a) (1988)). BHIGR later amended its complaint to seek return of the fossil as
personal property to which BHIGR had a superior possessoly right as against the govern-
ment, rather than an ownership right. Id. at 1018. According to one account, the Chey-
enne River Sioux Tribe's lawyers interpreted the amendment as an admission by BHIGR
that it had no valid claim to ownership of the fossil. Frankel, supra note 28, at 45. For a
discussion of a possible strategy behind BHIGR's amendment of its complaint, see id.
32. BHIGR sought return of the fossil for safekeeping on the grounds that the govern-
ment's storage method was causing irreparable damage. Black Hills I, 967 F.2d at 1238-39.
The government placed the fossil in a machine shop at the South Dakota School of Mines
and Technology (the School of Mines) following the seizure. Id. at 1239-40. The district
court initially rejected the motion for injunctive relief without addressing the damage is-
sue. Id. at 1238 (citing Black Hills Inst. v. United States Dep't ofJustice, Civ. 92-5070, slip
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Sioux Tribe also claimed an interest in the fossil, identified by tribal
lawyers as part of the tribe's cultural heritage. 3 As stewards of the
land, tribal officials explained, the tribe had the responsibility to con-
trol the fossil, not only for the current generation, "but unto the sev-
enth generation."34
C. The District Court's Rejection of BHIGR's Claim
In February 1993 the South Dakota District Court addressed
whether BHIGR had obtained ownership of the fossil.3 5 Before decid-
ing the ownership issue, the court reviewed the basic principles of leg-
islative intent with respect to Indians and the trust status of Indian
lands.36 The court affirmed that the "underlying rule" controlling ju-
dicial construction of legislation related to Indians is congressional
intent.37 Courts must resolve doubtful expressions in favor of the In-
dians, whom the court characterized as a "'weak and defenseless peo-
ple who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection in
good faith."' 38 The court compared the protection for Indian benefi-
ciaries contemplated by the General Allotment Act of 1887, also
known as the Dawes Act-which provided for the allotment of tribal
op. at 2 (D.S.D. May 28, 1992)). BHIGR appealed the denial of the preliminary injunction
and also sought an order granting it custody of the fossil pending the appeal of the prelim-
inary injunction denial. Id. at 1238. The court of appeals remanded the case to the district
court to determine the proper temporary custodian. Id. at 1241. Following a three-day
hearing, the district court awarded temporary custody to the School of Mines. Black Hills
/, 978 F.2d 1043, 1044 (8th Cir. 1992). The court of appeals affirmed the district court's
custody order, dismissed BHIGR's appeal of the denial of injunctive relief, and remanded
the case for further proceedings on the merits. Id. at 1045.
33. Malcolm W. Browne, Dealer Sues U.S. Over Seized Tyrannosaur Bones, N.Y. TIMES, May
24, 1992, at 17.
34. Pasternak, supra note 19, at Al (quoting tribal Attorney General Steven C. Emery).
35. Black Hills 111, 812 F. Supp. at 1017. Although BHIGR had amended its complaint
to claim superior possessory rights rather than to quiet title, the court decided that because
"a permanent possessory right to the fossil is subsumed within the context of ownership," it
had to decide the ownership issue. Id. at 1018; see also supra note 31 and accompanying
text (discussing the original complaint).
36. Black Hills IL, 812 F. Supp. at 1019. The court also concluded that it had federal
question jurisdiction to hear the case because resolution of the ownership issue required
the application and interpretation of federal statutes concerning Indian trust lands. Id.
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988)). The court further explained that the Quiet Title Act did
not provide an independent basis for jurisdiction. Id.; see also supra note 31 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the Quiet Title Act). The court of appeals affirmed the district
court's exercise of jurisdiction. Black Hills I, 12 F.3d 737, 740 (8th Cir. 1993).
37. Black Hills 11, 812 F. Supp. at 1019.
38. Id. (quoting Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977)).
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lands to individual tribal members 39 -to the protection afforded to
beneficiaries of spendthrift trusts. In order to protect Indians in
cases where the United States holds legal title to Indian lands in trust,
alienation of such lands must be authorized by Congress and comply
with the rules and regulations of the Secretary of the Interior.4
Although the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA) ended the fed-
eral policy of allotment of Indian lands,4" federal law continued to
provide for the issuance of trust patents to individual Indians.4" Mau-
rice Williams's trust patent had been issued in 1969, and the restric-
tions on alienation of the land were not to expire until 1994.44
Federal law relating to the alienation of trust lands authorized the
Secretary of the Interior to make land grants through the issuance of
fee patents, remove alienation restrictions, and approve conveyances
with respect to land or interests in land held by individual Indians
pursuant to the IRA, upon application of the Indian owner.45 If the
embedded fossil were land or an interest in land, the alienation re-
strictions would apply to the fossil, and Williams could not convey an
interest in the fossil without the Secretary's approval.46 Because Wil-
liams had not applied to the Secretary for removal of the alienation
restrictions or for approval of the sale of an interest in the land to
BHIGR, any purported sale was null and void.47
BHIGR argued that the embedded fossil was neither land nor an
interest in land and that Williams therefore could enter into a con-
tract for the fossil's excavation and removal.48 Because there was no
39. See infra notes 295-304 and accompanying text (describing the General Allotment
Act, ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25
U.S.C. (1988))).
40. Black Hills II1, 812 F. Supp. at 1019.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1019-20 (citing Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 383, ch. 576,
48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1988))).
43. Id. at 1020.
44. Id. The trust patent was issued on September 23, 1969; the alienation restrictions
were due to expire on September 23, 1994. Id. The trust patent provided that the United
States would hold the land "for the period of twenty-five years, in trust for the sole use and
benefit of the said Indian, and at the expiration of said period the United States will con-
vey the same by patent to the said Indian in fee . .. ." Id. at 1017.
45. Id. at 1020 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 483 (1988)). The Secretary of the Interior has issued
regulations to implement 25 U.S.C. § 483. Id. See 25 C.F.R. pt. 152 (1995).
46. Black Hills II1, 812 F. Supp. at 1020.
47. Id. The regulations promulgated to implement 25 U.S.C. § 483 also provided that
"inducing an Indian to execute an instrument purporting to convey any trust land or inter-
est therein, or the offering of any such instrument for record, is prohibited and criminal
penalties may be incurred...." Id. at 1020-21 (quoting 25 C.F.RI § 152.22(a)).
48. Id. at 1020. BHIGR also argued that the fossil became personal property upon
severance from the land and therefore was not subject to the restriction against alienation..
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case authority holding that an embedded fossil was an interest in land,
the court turned to state statutory definitions of land.49 South Dakota
law defined "land" as "'the solid material of the earth, whatever may
be the ingredients of which it is composed, whether soil, rock, or
other substance."'5 ° The court concluded that the embedded fossil
was an interest in land under the South Dakota statute and that it
therefore was subject to the federal requirements for approval of con-
veyances.51 Such a finding concerning a nearly priceless fossil was
consistent with Congress's intent to protect Indian lands from "im-
provident alienation."52
The court concluded by reiterating that the land at issue was trust
land, and under the terms of both the trust patent and federal laws
and regulations, the sale of an interest in the land required the con-
sent of the Secretary of the Interior."5 In the absence of such consent,
the attempted sale of the fossil was null and void, and BHIGR ob-
tained no legal interest in the fossil.54 The court noted that obtaining
secretarial approval would have been relatively simple and BHIGR
had to assume much of the fault caused by its failure to conform its
conduct to the applicable federal laws and regulations.55
D. The Court of Appeals's Affirmance
In December 1993 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court'sjudgment "that the United States holds trust title to
the fossil ... . 56 The Eighth Circuit's approach to the ownership
issue was very similar to the district court's approach. The court re-
Id. at 1021 n.6. The court held that the status of the fossil, and the law applicable to it,
must be evaluated before severance. Id.
49. Id. at 1021.
50. Id. (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-1-4 (1983)).
51. Id.
52. See supra note 25 (describing the fossil's value). The court also briefly described a
number of federal statutes that demonstrated congressional intent to protect Indians
against acquisition of their land or of interests in their land by requiring federal approval
for public highways through allotted lands, farming and grazing leases, mining leases, oil
and gas leases, and the alienation of allotments. Black Hills I, 812 F. Supp. at 1021-22
(citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 311, 393, 396, 396e, 392 (1988), respectively).
53. Black Hills HI, 812 F. Supp. at 1019-21.
54. Id. The court dismissed BHIGR's complaint and entered judgment in favor of the
Department ofJustice. Id.
55. Id. The court noted further that BHIGR should have investigated the status of the
land and "ran the risk of this unlawful taking of the fossil from Indian land by not having
done so." Id. For a newspaper account of the decision, see Malcolm W. Browne, Fossil
Belongs Not Just to the Age but to the US., a Judge Declares, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1993, at A12.
56. Black Hills 1V, 12 F.3d 737, 739 (8th Cir. 1993). The court first found that the
district court had federal question jurisdiction over the case. Id. at 740. The court rejected
BHIGR's argument that the district court erred in deciding ownership because BHIGR's
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viewed the status of Maurice Williams's land, and characterized Wil-
liams as "a beneficial owner of the land, retaining certain judicially-
recognized rights but lacking the absolute right to dispose of the land
as he pleases."57 The limitations on his interest in his trust land were
reflected in federal statutory provisions prohibiting the "'sale, devise,
gift, exchange, or other transfer'" of restricted Indian trust lands5"
and authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to remove alienation re-
strictions and approve conveyances on the application of Indian own-
ers.5 9 Thus federal law provided a mechanism for Williams to alienate
all or part of his interest before the trust patent expired, but in this
instance, the required approval had not been sought, let alone ob-
tained.6" Any attempted sale of an interest in trust land in violation of
the approval requirement was void and did not transfer title to the
would-be purchaser.61 Thus, if the fossil was land before excavation,
the transaction between BHIGR and Williams was void.6 2
In the absence of a federal statutory definition of land, the court
of appeals, like the district court,6" looked to state property law defini-
tions, and concluded that the fossil was "land" within the meaning of
the federal statutory provisions." The court reasoned as follows:
Under South Dakota law, the fossil was an "ingredient" com-
prising part of the "solid material of the earth." It was a com-
ponent part of Williams' land, just like the soil, the rocks,
and whatever other naturally-occurring materials make up
the earth of the ranch.... That the fossil once was a dino-
saur which walked on the surface of the earth and that part
of the fossil was protruding from the ground ... are irrele-
vant. The salient point is that the fossil had for millions of
second amended complaint sought only possession, rather than ownership, of the fossil.
Id. at 740-41.
57. Id. at 741.
58. Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 464 (1988)).
59. Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 483 (1988)).
60. Id.
61. Id. (citing Mottaz v. United States, 753 F.2d 71, 74 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other
grounds, 476 U.S. 834 (1981)).
62. Id. at 742. The court noted that although the fossil was now personalty, it was part
of the land at the time of discovery. Id. The court "would render the statutory restraint on
alienation here essentially meaningless if Williams could transfer the right to excavate a
priceless fossil derived from otherwise nondescript land without the Secretary's permis-
sion." Id.
63. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
64. Black HiUs IV 12 F.3d at 742 (citing S.D. CODFiED LAws ANN. §§ 43-1-2 to -4
(1983)).
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years been an "ingredient" of the earth that the United
States holds in trust for Williams.6"
The court held that because Williams did not seek the Secretary's ap-
proval, his attempted sale to BHIGR was void and the United States
held the fossil in trust for him.66
The court also addressed BHIGR's argument that the trust rela-
tionship between the United States and Williams did not govern the
fossil.67 BHIGR argued that the federal government's trust duties re-
garding Williams's land were limited to safeguarding the reservation
land base through alienation restrictions and preservation of the
land's tax-exempt status. 8 Because no statutes regulated fossils on In-
dian trust lands and the fossil was unrelated to the land base, BHIGR
asserted that the government's seizure exceeded the scope of its trust
duties.69 The court, relying on its characterization of the fossil as
land, rejected BHIGR's argument.7 " The absence of statutes regulat-
ing fossils did not affect the validity of the purported sale to BHIGR
because there were statutory provisions governing the alienation of in-
terests in trust land, such as the fossil at issue.71 Because the fossil was
part of Williams's trust land and Williams did not obtain approval for
the attempted sale of the excavation rights, the government's seizure
was a proper exercise of its trust duties under the Dawes Act.7"
The court also rejected BHIGR's argument that invalidating the
purported sale was bad policy because it undermined tribal self-deter-
mination.73 The court characterized this concern as a matter for Con-
gress to address, explaining that it was bound to apply the statutory
provisions preventing the alienation of trust lands without the Secre-
tary's approval until Congress determined "that the historic practice
65. Id.
66. Id. The court explained that the trust continued in the fossil when it became per-
sonalty. Id. at 743.
67. Id. For a description of the trust relationship, see FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDLAN LAW 220-28 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982).
68. Black Hills IV, 12 F.3d at 743.
69. Id. BHIGR cited United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980), and United States
v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983), in support of its argument that the fossil was personal
property, not part of the land base. Black Hils IV, 12 F.3d at 743. The court distinguished
the Mitchell cases because they addressed the government's fiduciary duties to beneficial
owners of trust land, not the power of beneficial owners to alienate trust land. Id.
70. Black Hills II, 12 F.3d at 743.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 743-44.
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of shielding beneficial owners from their own improvident decisions
• . . is no longer wise."74
In February 1994 the court of appeals issued an order denying
BHIGR's petition for rehearing.75 Counsel for BHIGR filed a petition
for certiorari in May 1994.76 In October 1994 the Supreme Court de-
nied the petition,77 thus allowing the Eighth Circuit's decision that
the United States held the fossil in trust for Maurice Williams to stand.
II. PALEONTOLOGICAL RESOURCES AS PART OF THE "SACRED TEXT":
NATIVE AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE LAND, STONES,
AND FossiLs
Based on Anglo-American concepts of land as embodied in state
statutes, the opinions in the Black Hills case treated the Tyrannosaurus
rex fossil, which BHIGR removed from the Cheyenne River Sioux Res-
ervation, as an interest in land. The opinions did not discuss Native
American attitudes toward the land or toward stones and fossils in de-
termining rights in the fossil. Native Americans traditionally have had
an understanding of the land that differs sharply from the Anglo-
American understanding. For Native Americans, the land has great
cultural and religious significance. Professor Frank Pommersheim
has noted, for example, that the land of the Lakota Sioux is "part of
the 'sacred text' of Lakota religion and culture.""8 To understand tri-
74. Id. at 744. The court also rejected BHIGR's claim that the district court's decision
violated its due process rights. Id. Although the court found it "unfortunate" that BHIGR
.spent a great deal of time and resources adding value to a fossil it does not own," the
conclusion that BHIGR's transaction with Williams was void did not deprive BHIGR of due
process because BHIGR had no interest in the fossil and could have protected itself. Id.
The court noted that discovery of the fossil on reservation land should have alerted BHIGR
to the possibility of some United States property interest. Id.
75. Id. at 746 (order denying petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en
banc).
76. Black Hills Inst. of Geological Research v. South Dakota Sch. of Mines and Tech-
nology, 12 F.3d 737 (8th Cir. 1993), petition for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3832 (U.S. June 14,
1994) (No. 93-1825).
77. Black Hills Inst. of Geological Research v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 115 S. Ct.
61 (1994). For a newspaper account of the Court's decision, see Malcolm W. Browne, High
Court Lets Stand Dinosaur Fossil Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1994, at C6.
78. Frank Pommersheim, The Reservation as Place: A South Dakota Essay, 34 S.D. L. Ray.
246, 269 (1989). The Lakota, or Teton, Sioux are one of the three main groups of Sioux.
EDWARD LAZARUS, BLACK HILLS/WHITE JUSTICE: THE Sioux NATION VERSUS THE UNITED
STATES, 1775 TO THE PRESENT 4 (1991). The Lakota are divided into seven bands, and
today occupy the Pine Ridge, Rosebud, Cheyenne River, Standing Rock, Crow Creek, and
Lower Brule Reservations in South Dakota and North Dakota, and the Fort Peck Reserva-
tion in Montana. Id. The second group, the Dakota, or Santee, Sioux, consists of the
Sisseton, Wahpeton, Wahpekute, and Mdewakanton tribes. Id. The third group is the
Yankton, or Nakota, Sioux, consisting of the Yankton and Yanktonai. Id. All the Sioux
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bal interests in paleontological resources on reservation lands, it is
necessary to consider traditional Native American attitudes toward the
land and nature and toward the materials that compose the land, in-
cluding stones and fossils.79 Moreover, while these attitudes may be
described as "traditional," it must be appreciated that they are part of
living religions-religions that have survived despite determined ef-
forts to destroy them"° and that are increasingly being revitalized."
A. The Native American Worldview: Land as the Sacred Text
Native American attitudes toward the land must be studied in the
context of the broader Native American worldview-a worldview that
differs profoundly from the Anglo-American conceptions that shaped
the development of American law, including law related to land and
fossils. The Native American view is characterized by a holistic under-
standing of the world and society, a nonlinear approach to time and
process, a special relationship with nature, and an appreciation of the
sacred nature of the earth.
Professor Rennard Strickland has described the fundamental Na-
tive American and the Anglo-American approaches to life as being "at
opposite ends of the scale of perception."8 2 Anglo-American society
together constitute the Oceti Sakowin ("Seven Council Fires"). Id. The designation "Sioux"
is a French corruption of the name given to them by rival tribes. Id. Lame Deer reported
that "[o]ur people don't call themselves Sioux or Dakota. That's white man talk. We call
ourselves Ikce Wicasa-the natural humans, the free, wild, common people." LAME DEER
& ERDOES, supra note 3, at 14.
79. The description of the Native American worldview and of Native American beliefs
with respect to land in Part II is a necessarily brief overview of certain attitudes and beliefs
that have been identified as fundamental elements of virtually all Native American reli-
gious traditions. These elements have found expression in "a rich plurality of highly differ-
entiated types of religious traditions." JOSEPH E. BROWN, THE SPIRITUAL LEGACY OF THE
AMERICAN INDIAN 1 (1982). AsJoseph Brown has explained, "[tihe migration over succes-
sive time periods, the diversity of physical types, a thousand or more tribal groups with
several hundred mutually unintelligible languages .... and all with the contrasts of Ameri-
can geography and climatic zones ... , present complexities and questions that still evade
scholars." Id. at 4-5. Lame Deer wrote of the underlying unity of these diverse traditions:
"[A]II the Indian religions somehow are part of the same belief, the same mystery. Our
unity, it's in there." LAME DEER & ERDoEs, supra note 3, at 260.
80. The destruction of Native American religious traditions was an important part of
the federal government's assimilation policy in the nineteenth century. See infra note 459
and accompanying text; see also LAME DEER & ERDOES, supra note 3, at 128 (describing the
destruction of sacred objects).
81. BROWN, supra note 79, at 5, 47-49.
82. Rennard Strickland, Implementing the National Policy of Understanding Preserving, and
Safeguarding the Heritage of Indian Peoples and Native Hawaiians: Human Rights, Sacred Objects,
and Cultural Patrimony, 24 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 175, 181 (1992); see also AMERICAN INDIAN MvrHS




tends to see law, religion, art, and economics as separate components
of society, while Native American society tends to see them as part of
an organic, unified whole whose component parts are interdepen-
dent."3 Joseph Brown has noted that no Native American language
has a single word that can be translated as "religion," and that Native
Americans cannot separate what Anglo-American society refers to as
"religion" from the other aspects of their culture.8 4 Similarly, while
European thought has historically classified all things as either living
or dead and ranked them in status "from the lowly beast to the virtu-
ous archangel,"85 Native American thought "conceives of all worlds-
natural and supernatural, ancestral and contemporary-and their in-
habitants as simultaneous, coequal, and balanced."86 Thus, Native
American thought envisions time and process not in the European
linear and "progress"-oriented manner, but in a cyclical and recipro-
cal manner.8 7 This perspective is apparent in the words of the Sioux
holy man Black Elk: "[E]verything an Indian does is in a circle, and
83. Strickland, supra note 82, at 181.
84. BROWN, supra note 79, at 2. Clyde Kluckhohn and Dorothea Cross Leighton de-
scribed this perspective among the Navajo as follows:
[I]t makes a little more sense to speak of religion as one separable part of life in
white society than it does in the Navaho case. The white world is now mainly a
secular world .... With the Navaho it is quite different. Their world is still a
whole. Every daily act is colored by their conceptions of supernatural forces, ever
present and ever threatening .... There is no word or phrase in their language
which could possibly be translated as "religion."
CLYDE KLUCKHOHN & DOROTHEA LEIGHTON, THE NAVAHO 179 (Lucy H. Wales & Richard
Kluckhohn revs., Natural History Library, Anchor 1962) (1946). For a brief description of
the Navajo religious tradition, see BROWN, supra note 79, at 22-25.
85. Strickland, supra note 82, at 182; see also MyrHS AND LEGENDS, supra note 82, at xi.
86. Strickland, supra note 82, at 182.
87. BROWN, supra note 79, at 4, 49-50, 118-20. Jamake Highwater has described the
European, or "Western," view of time as follows:
The Western grasp of time is pervasive, making itself visible in the way languages
are constructed and the way people are required to arrange their thoughts in a
recognizable sequence-even when this requires them to alter their special ex-
periences (such as dreams) in order to fit them into the acceptable temporal
framework. It is imperative in the West to falsify our consciousness so it fits the
stream of duration that carries us out of the past and into the future. The modal-
ity is linear and it is composed equally of a past, present, and future through
which a sequence of enduring events follow one another in an orderly and calcu-
lable manner.
JAMAKE HIGHWATER, THE PRIMAL MIND: VISION AND REALITY IN INDIAN AMERICA 94 (1981).
By contrast, Native American consciousness, like the consciousness of other primal peo-
ples, "is larger than the psychological geography by which the West knows it. It overflows
linearity in dreams, imaginings, visions, intuitions, and all those quintessential and amor-
phous experiences that must call upon metaphor in order to surface into Western mental-
ity." Id. at 96; see also PAULA GUNN ALLEN, THE SACRED Hoop: RECOVERING THE FEMININE IN
AMERICAN INDIAN TRADmONS 59 (1986) (discussing the fluidity of Native American percep-
tions of time, space, and humanity); STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, CRAzY HORSE AND CUSTER: THE
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that is because the Power of the World always works in circles, and
everything tries to be round .... The life of a man is a circle from
childhood to childhood, and so it is in everything where power
moves."88 Lame Deer, another Sioux holy man, described the circle
as the Indians' symbol:
The [Sioux] nation was only a part of the universe, in itself
circular and made of the earth, which is round, of the sun,
which is round, of the stars, which are round.... To us this
is beautiful and fitting, symbol and reality at the same time,
expressing the harmony of life and nature. Our circle is
timeless, flowing .... ."
The white man's symbol, on the other hand, is the square: "Square is
his house .... Square are the white man's gadgets .... These all
have corners and sharp edges-points in time, white man's time, with
appointments, time clocks and rush hours .... 90
Native Americans' holistic view of the world and nonlinear ap-
proach to time and process are coupled with a special relationship
with nature. They enjoy "a special quality and intensity of interrela-
tionship with the forms and forces of their natural environment.""1 In
order to survive as nomadic hunters and gatherers or as agriculturists,
Native Americans had to develop a detailed knowledge of all aspects
of their natural environment. This knowledge, however, went beyond
mere practicalities-the "accumulated pragmatic lore was . . .always
interrelated with a sacred lore; together these could be said to consti-
tute a metaphysic of nature."92 In Native American thought, all natu-
ral forms are sacred.9" They are seen as mysteriously interrelated, with
PARALLEL LIVES OF Two AMERICAN WARRIORS 109-13 (1975) (describing the contrasting
worldviews of Crazy Horse and Custer).
88. JOHN G. NEIHARDT, BLACK ELK SPEAKs 198-99 (Bison Books 1961) (1932). As used
by Black Elk in this passage, "power" has a particular religious connotation. "To the Ameri-
can Indian, power is a metaphysical reality that permeates the cosmos. All beings, animate
or inanimate, possess power in the form of either patent or latent energy, as well as poten-
tial consciousness. Powers... are interchangeable with the concept of sacred or spiritual
medicine." Strickland, supra note 82, at 184. For a discussion of Black Elk and his vision,
see ALLEN, supra note 87, at 107-16.
89. LAME DEER & EPDors, supra note 3, at 111.
90. Id.
91. BROwN, supra note 79, at 4.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 37; see also LAME DEER & ERDOES, supra note 3, at 123 ("To us life, all life, is
sacred."); Strickland, supra note 82, at 184 ("American Indian thought revolves around a
reverence for nature . . .
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nothing existing in isolation.94 Human beings are regarded as having
a special role as guardians of the natural world,95 while still sharing a
"oneness of essence" with animals.96 Rennard Strickland summarized
this perspective: "Seeing the universe through the eyes of a contem-
porary Native American is to see it as a complex whole of natural
forces and spiritual beings-animal, human, and supernatural-wo-
ven together in a delicate, intricate, and indlivisible web."97
This view of nature and natural forms is bound up with Native
American attitudes toward the earth itself. Among the Sioux, for ex-
ample, the earth is regarded as sacred and as having two aspects:
Grandmother and Mother.9" As Mother, the earth is regarded as "the
producer of all growing forms, in act."' As Grandmother, the earth
"refers to the ground or substance of all growing things-potential-
ity."'100 The Sioux rite for the keeping of the soul, for example, ad-
dresses the earth in both aspects: "My relatives, Grandmother and
Mother Earth, we are of earth, and belong to You. 0 Mother Earth
from whom we receive our food, You care for our growth as do our
own mothers."'O° Participants in the related rite for the releasing of
the soul also address the earth: "0 You, sacred Earth, from whence
we have come, You are humble, nourishing all things; we know that
you are wakan and that with You we are all as relatives."1" 2 The rela-
tionship between people and the land that is reflected in these prayers
is "the fundamental idea that permeates American Indian life":'0"
[T]he land (Mother) and the people (mothers) are the
same.... The earth is the source and the being of the peo-
ple, and we are equally the being of the earth. The land is
not really a place, separate from ourselves .... The earth is
not a mere source of survival .... Rather, . . . the earth is
94. BROWN, supra note 79, at 53. This view is reflected in the concluding language of
the Lakota Sioux pipe ceremony: "We are all related!" Id.; see also LAME DEER & ERDOES,
supra note 3, at 268; infra notes 141-146 (describing the sacred pipe).
95. BROWN, supra note 79, at 40.
96. Id. at 125.
97. Strickland, supra note 82, at 183. See generally LAME DEER & ERDOEs, supra note 3, at
119-41 (discussing the Sioux's relationship with nature).
98. THE SACRED PIPE: BLACK ELK'S ACCOUNT OF THE SEVEN RITES OF THE OGLALA SIOUX
6 (Joseph E. Brown ed., Penguin Books 1971) (1953) [hereinafter SACRED PIPE].
99. Id. at 6 n.7.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 13. For a detailed description of the rite, see id. at 10-15.
102. Id. at 20. The word wakan was defined by Lame Deer as meaning "mysterious,
wonderful, incomprehensible, holy." LAME DEER & ERDOES, supra note 3, at 114. The re-
leasing of the soul rite is described in SACRED PIPE, supra note 98, at 19-30.
103. ALLEN, supra note 87, at 119..
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being, as all creatures are also being: aware, palpable, intelli-
gent, alive." 4
These attitudes toward the earth and nature are reflected in the
Native American understanding of place:
Native American experiences of place are infused with
mythic themes. . . [that] express events of sacred time
... [and] are experienced through landmarks in each peo-
ple's immediate natural environment.... [E]very particular
form of the land, is experienced as the locus of qualitatively
differentiated spirit beings, whose individual and collective
presence sanctifies and gives meaning to the land in all its
details and contours.1 0 5
The landscape itself is viewed as sacred, and as embodying "a divinity
that it shares with everything that is part of nature, including human
beings, animals, plants, rocks . . . everything. "'106 Certain locations,
such as mountains and lakes, are viewed as especially important points
of contact with powerful spirits and forces." 7
For the Sioux, the Black Hills region of South Dakota, an area of
rare beauty,10 is particularly sacred. The Black Hills played a central
role in a vision described by Black Elk: "I saw far off the Black Hills
and the center of the world where the spirits had taken me in my
great vision."' 0 9 To the Sioux, the Black Hills is "the place of gods and
holy mountains, where warriors went to speak with the Great Spirit
104. Id.; see also MYTHs AND LEGENDS, supra note 82, at xi ("Mysterious but real power
dwells in nature-in mountains, rivers, rocks, even pebbles. White people may consider
them inanimate objects, but to the Indian, they are enmeshed in the web of the universe,
pulsating with life and potent with medicine.").
105. BRow-N, supra note 79, at 51.
106. HiGHWATER, supra note 87, at 124 (alteration in original); see also LAME DEER &
ERDOEs, supra note 3, at 127.
107. HiGHWATER, supra note 87, at 127.
108. RALPH K. ANDRIST, THE LONG DEATH: THE LAST DAYS OF THE PLAINS INDIANS 244
(1964). According to one description, the Black Hills area stands
like an island amid the monotonous plains, a range of small mountains, split with
shadowed canyons, dramatic with rock formations, cool with the shade of pine
trees, watered with frequent streams. Even the climate is different in this place;
the rains fall more abundantly while around the plains are dry and alkaline.
Id.
109. NEIHARDT, supra note 88, at 230. Tatoke Inyanke (Running Antelope) also de-
scribed the centrality of the Black Hills: "The land known as the Black Hills is considered
by the Indians as the center of their land. The ten nations of the Sioux are looking toward
that as the center of their land." BROWN, supra note 2, at 274. For a detailed analysis of the
significance of visions in the religious traditions of the Plains tribes, see generally LEE IR-




and await visions."11° The sacred significance of the Black Hills was
beyond the comprehension of federal government agents who sought
to wrest control of the area from the Sioux in the late nineteenth
century.11 To the government, the Black Hills region was simply a
piece of real estate to be obtained for a price and exploited for its
tangible resources. 1 2 For their part, the Sioux found it difficult to
understand a society for which "each blade of grass or spring of water
has a price tag on it."" 3
B. The Sacred Signicance of Stones
Fossils result when the spaces once filled by the organic matter of
a dead organism are replaced by mineral substances, and the organ-
ism thus "literally turns to stone."1 4 For Native Americans, the sacred
nature of the land extends to stones and other elements that are part
of the land. The stones that are a part of "the solid material of the
earth" 15 have a significance for Native Americans apart from any
commercial value. Sacred stones-"perhaps one of the oldest and
most primordial religious objects among Native Americans"' 16 -play a
role in myths, legends, and religious and healing rites, and also serve
as a protective force for individuals." 7
110. BROWN, supra note 2, at 276. The Cheyenne regarded Bear Butte, located in the
northeast end of the Black Hills, as the "Sacred Mountain," an area where spiritual power
was particularly intense. Ruth Rosenberg, Introduction to LAME DEER & ERDoEs, supra note
3, at xxii; see also Richard Pemberton, Jr., "I Saw That It Was Holy". The Black Hills and the
Concept of Sacred Land, 3 LAW & INEQ.J. 287, 292-93 (1985) (recounting the Indians' efforts
to regain control of the Black Hills).
111. In the eyes of General Custer, for example, the Sioux were not "using" the Black
Hills and therefore should have relinquished the area to non-Indians who undoubtedly
would. AMBROSE, supra note 87, at 380-81.
112. Id.
113. LAME DEER & ERDOES, supra note 3, at 36. In 1980 the Supreme Court decided that
an 1877 statute that abrogated Sioux treaty rights effected a taking of the Black Hills for
which the Sioux were entitled to just compensation. United States v. Sioux Nation, 448
U.S. 371 (1980). The Sioux have refused to accept the resulting monetary award, which
continues to draw interest and amounts to approximately $380 million. DirkJohnson, To
Some Sioux, Costner Now Dances With Devil N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1995, at A12. See generally
LAZARUS, supra note 78 (examining the Sioux's legal battles for land rights).
114. YvES-r GAYRARD-VALY, FOSSILS: EVIDENCE OF VANISHED WORLDS 156 (I. Mark Paris
trans., Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 1994) (1987); see also infra note 419 (discussing fossils).
115. This is the South Dakota statutory definition of land used in the Black Hills opin-
ions. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-1-4 (1983), quoted in Black Hills II, 812 F. Supp.
1015, 1021 (D.S.D. 1993).
116. IRWIN, supra note 109, at 224.
117. Id. at 221-28.
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Sioux religion is particularly rich in stories and religious rites in-
volving sacred stones."n The oldest of the Sioux gods is Tunka, or
Tunkan, the stone god.1" 9 Tunka was "like a rock, old beyond imagi-
nation, ageless, eternal." 2 ' He was originally worshipped in the form
of a large stone that had been painted red."'
The religious significance of stones is also apparent in the Sioux
story of Iyan Hokshi, or "Stone Boy." According to one version of the
legend,1 22 a young woman whose five brothers had mysteriously disap-
peared while hunting swallowed a round pebble in the hope that it
would kill her.1 2 ' Four days later she gave birth to a male child whom
she named Stone Boy. 12 4 After growing at an amazing rate, Stone Boy
went in search of his missing uncles.1 25 Upon finding his uncles'
dried and apparently lifeless bodies, Stone Boy was directed by a pile
of stones to build a sweat lodge.1 26 He placed heated stones in the
middle of the lodge and poured water over them, as the talking stones
had directed. 127 After the resulting steam restored his uncles to life,
Stone Boy told them:
The rock saved me, and now it has saved you. Iyan, Tunka-
rock-Tunka, lyan. Tunkashila, the Grandfather Spirit, we
will learn to worship. This little lodge, these rocks, the water,
the fire-these are sacred, these we will use from now on as
we have done here for the first time: for purification, for
life, for wichosani, for health. 121
118. Many of the stories and rites described in subsections B and C of Part II are drawn
from the Sioux and other Plains tribes. These tribes are particularly appropriate subjects
for analyzing the sacred significance of stones and fossils because many of the areas these
tribes occupy are rich in fossils, as demonstrated not only by the Black Hills case, but also by
the extensive fossil-collecting activities in these areas by nineteenth century paleontolo-
gists. See, e.g., infra notes 240-248 and accompanying text (describing fossil hunting by
Marsh on Sioux lands).
119. LAME DEER & ERwors, supra note 3, at 113; MyrHs AND LEGENDS, supra note 82, at
xii.
120. LAME DEER & ERDOES, supra note 3, at 193.
121. Id.
122. The version recounted here was told by a Sioux elder, Henry Crow Dog, to Richard
Erdoes in 1968. MYrHS AND LEGENDS, supra note 82, at 15-19. An alternate spelling of
Stone Boy's Sioux name is Inyan Hoksi LAME DEER & ERDOES, supra note 3, at 182. Lame
Deer's version of the story is included in id. at 182-84. Inyan, or iyan, is the more modern
Sioux word for rock or stone. Id. at 193.
123. MYrHS AND LEGENDS, supra note 82, at 16.
124. Id. at 16-17.
125. Id. at 17.
126. Id. at 18.
127. Id. at 18-19.
128. Id. at 19. Tunkashila is the old Sioux word for grandfather, stone, and god, and is
also a name for the Great Spirit. LAME DEER & ERDOES, supra note 3, at 193.
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The sweat lodge instituted by Stone Boy is still used in Sioux puri-
fication rites.' 9 Heated rocks, placed in the center of a small dome-
shaped structure made of willow saplings and buffalo hides, are sprin-
kled with water and give off purifying steam."' The rocks represent
the earth and the eternal nature of Wakan-Tanka, the Great Spirit. 3
According to Black Elk's description of the rites, the participants ad-
dressed the rocks as follows: "0 ancient rocks ... you are now here
with us; Wakan-Tanka has made the Earth, and has placed you next to
Her. Upon you generations will walk, and their steps shall not
falter!"13
2
The sweat lodge is part of the religious tradition of other Plains
tribes, such as the Absarokee, or Crow, and the Gros Ventre, 133 as well
as of the Navajo.1 34 The Navajo, in addition to using stones in the
sweat lodge, place stones from the sweat lodge at the bases of fruit
Ohiyesa, a Sioux doctor and writer also known as Charles Eastman, recorded another
version of this story. CHARLES A. EASTMAN (OHIESA), INDIAN BOYHOOD 108-17 (Bison
Books 1991) (1971). In Ohiyesa's version, which was told to him by an elder named Smoky
Day, the woman had ten brothers and gave birth after only one day. Id. at 109-10. Stone
Boy found the bones of his uncles and restored them to life in the country of the Thunder
Birds, to which he had been magically transported. Id. at 112-14. Ohiyesa also recorded
an additional story about Stone Boy. Despite warnings by his uncles, Stone Boy wantonly
hunted and killed animals. Id. at 115. Stone Boy's mother and uncles were drowned in a
torrential rain sent by the Thunder Birds at the behest of the animals. According to
Ohiyesa's account,
Stone Boy himself could not be entirely destroyed, but he was overcome by his
[animal] enemies and left half buried in the earth, condemned never to walk
again, and there we find him to this day. "This was because he abused his
strength, and destroyed for mere amusement the lives of creatures given him for
use only."
Id. at 117. Ohiyesa also described the annual "feast of the maidens," during which young
women danced around a red, cone-shaped rock stood on end, and then touched the stone
as a declaration of purity. Id. at 155-60.
129. BROWN, supra note 79, at 42-43.
130. Id. For a description of the sweat lodge ceremony, see id. at 42-44.
131. Id. at 42-43; see also LAME DEER & ERroEs, supra note 3, at 184-90; SACRED PIPE, supra
note 98, at 31-43. Wakan-Tanka, the Great Spirit, is sometimes referred to as Father and
sometimes as Grandfather. SACRED PIPE, supra note 98, at 32-33. According to one expla-
nation, "Wakan-Tanka as Grandfather is the Great-Spirit independent of manifestation, un-
qualified, unlimited .... Wakan-Tanka as Father is the Great Spirit considered in relation
to his manifestation, either as Creator, Preserver, or Destroyer." Id. at 5 n.6. Another
description of the sweat lodge is included in NEIHARDT, supra note 88, at 185.
132. SACRED PIPE, supra note 98, at 37. Stones are also used in the Hanbecheyapi, the
Sioux "Crying for a Vision" ritual, described in id. at 44-66. As part of this ritual, the stones
are addressed as follows: "0 you ancient rocks who are sacred, you have neither ears nor
eyes, yet you hear and see all things. Through your powers this young man has become
pure, that he may be worthy to go to receive some message from Wakan-Tanka" Id. at 56.
133. IRWIN, supra note 109, at 104, 179-80, 200; see also BROWN, supra note 79, at 11
(describing use of the sweat lodge by the Ojibwa-Chippewa).
134. KLUCKHOHN & LEIGHTON, supra note 84, at 206.
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trees and in the fields to prevent early frosts.'" 5 Navajos traveling
through Navajo country traditionally placed stones in three- to five-
foot high cairns next to trails, in the belief that this would bring
luck.13
6
The Crow traditionally used piles of rocks as shrines to noted war-
riors or chiefs, or to commemorate important battles."3 7 Visitors
would add rocks as a sign of respect, or to pray for a safe passage and
return.138 Other rock piles were considered haunted places to be
avoided."' Like the Navajo cairns these stones have a significance
beyond mere physical markers and, thus, are distinguishable from
stones used as surveyors' cornerstones and markers for miners'
claims.1 40
Stone is also one of the main elements of the sacred pipe of the
Plains Indians. The bowl of the pipe is made of red, or sometimes
black, stone.' 4 ' According to Sioux legend, the first pipe was brought
by a sacred woman in a white buckskin dress,14 identified by such
names as White Buffalo Woman 43 and Buffalo Cow Woman."' Ac-
cording to one version of the story, White Buffalo Woman explained
that the stone of the pipe bowl represented both the buffalo and the
"flesh and blood of the red man." 45 According to Black Elk's version,
135. Id. at 204.
136. Id. Stones, twigs, and bits of turquoise are also placed in the cairns. Id. The crea-
tor of the cairn utters a prayer such as the following:
Placing rocks, Male One.
Placing rocks, Female One.
Everywhere I go, myself
May I have luck.
Everywhere my close relatives go
May they have their luck.
Id.
137. JOSEPH MEDICINE CROW, FROM THE HEART OF THE CROW COUNTRY. THE CROW INDI-
ANS' OWN STORIES 83 (1992).
138. Id. at 83-84. Some living Crow tribal members recall that many of those rock piles
had to be removed when farming began in Crow country. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 85.
141. BROWN, supra note 79, at 44.
142. NEIHARDT, supra note 88, at 3. The gift of the sacred pipe is also described in LAME
DEER & ERDOES, supra note 3, at 265-69, and in SACRED PIPE, supra note 98, at 3-9.
143. See, e.g., MYrHs AND LEGENDS, supra note 82, at 47-52 (telling the myth of the White
Buffalo Woman).
144. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 79, at 44. Black Elk's account refers to her as White
Buffalo Cow Woman. SACRED PIPE, supra note 98, at 11.
145. MYTHS AND LEGENDS, supra note 82, at 50. In 1994 a rare white buffalo was born on
a farm in southern Wisconsin. Some Native Americans have hailed the female calf as em-
bodying the sacred spirit of White Buffalo Woman, who, according to Sioux legend, turned
into a white buffalo and promised to return. Richard Wronski, White Buffalo Fulfills a Tribal
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the woman said, "The bowl of this pipe is of red stone; it is the Earth.
Carved in the stone and facing the center is this buffalo calf who rep-
resents all the four-leggeds who live upon your Mother." 46 The wo-
man also brought a small round rock, made of the same red stone as
the pipe bowl and decorated with seven circles representing the seven
rites of the Sioux. 47
Stones have prominent importance in the medicine bundles of
many Plains tribes, 48 in the healing practices of their medicine
men, 149 and in the gourd rattles used in Sioux religious ceremo-
nies. 1 ° The buffalo-stone bundle of the Blackfoot, for example, "'has
been not only a powerful healer of the sick, but has, to those for
whom its owners have given its ceremony, prevented them becoming
sick and preserved them from all dangers so they have lived to reach
old age."'"" 1 A sacred meteorite was included in a Pawnee medicine
bundle.' 52 Stones are regarded as sharing "an ancient knowledge that
the earth alone possesses,"' thus being endowed with healing pow-
ers. 154 Stones are also believed to have other kinds of power, such as
the power to find lost objects, 155 look for buffalo, find medicinal
plants, scout for enemies, 156 and predict the future.' 57
Prophecy; Sacred Indian Symbol Is Drawing Crowds to Wisconsin Farm CHI. TRIB., Sept. 11, 1994,
at 6.
146. SACRED PIPE, supra note 98, at 6 (footnote omitted).
147. Id. at 6-7; LAME DEER & ERDOES, supra note 3, at 194. According to Black Elk, the
woman told the assembled Sioux: "This round rock.., is the Earth, your Grandmother
and Mother, and it is where you will live and increase." SACRED PIPE, supra note 98, at 7.
For Black Elk's description of the seven rites of the Oglala Sioux, see id. at 10-138.
148. See, e.g., IRWIN, supra note 109, at 224 (stones in Plains medicine bundles); see also
LAME DEER & ERDoEs, supra note 3, at 115 (the Great Mystery Medicine Bag). For a de-
scription of the Plains Indians' medicine bundles, see IRWIN, supra note 109, at 221-28.
Medicine bundles contain sacred objects, often sanctioned by a vision, and are used to
invoke power. Id. at 221. Medicine bundles can belong to an individual, to a specific
group, or to an entire tribe. Id.
149. See, e.g., IRwIN, supra note 109, at 35 (Blackfoot medicine man received curing
power from a stone); id. at 85 (Mandan woman received sacred blue stone for healing); see
also LAME DEER & ERDoas, supra note 3, at 194-95 (medicine stones).
150. LAME DEER & ER.oEs, supra note 3, at 200 (ceremonial gourds filled with sacred
stones).
151. IRwIN, supra note 109, at 222 (quotingJAMEs W. SCHULTZ, FRIENDS OF My LIFE AS AN
INDIAN 214 (1923)). The bundle is still kept on the Blackfoot Reservation in Montana. Id.
at 283 n.38.
152. Id. at 223-24.
153. Id. at 224.
154. Id. at 221-28.
155. Id. at 225.
156. LAME DEER & ERDOES, supra note 3, at 194.
157. IRWIN, supra note 109, at 225. Members of the Omaha secret pebble society kept a
translucent stone that was believed to convey the power of vision. Id. at 39-40.
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Stones may have particular significance for individuals because of
their protective powers. 158 Lame Deer wrote that "[e]very man needs
a stone to help him."159 According to Black Elk, Crazy Horse "carried
a sacred stone with him, like one he had seen in some vision, and...
when he was in danger, the stone always got very heavy and protected
him somehow."'" Crazy Horse carried this rock "from... [which] he
received much power and holiness,"161 in order that the vision's
power would not leave him.1 62
These descriptions of legends and religious rites reveal the sacred
significance of stones in traditional Native American thought. Far
from being mere physical components of the soil, stones share the
sacred nature of the earth of which they are a part.
C. Medicine Bones and Thunder-Beings: The Significance of Fossils
In addition to attributing sacred significance to stones in general,
the religious traditions of a number of tribes attach sacred signifi-
cance to fossils in particular. Moreover, mythic animals that have left
fossilized remains appear in the myths and legends of a number of
tribes. Attributing special significance to fossils is consistent with Na-
tive Americans' circular view of time and process. This conception
rejects the absolute dichotomy between past and present that charac-
terizes the linear Western sense of time.1 63 The Native American vi-
sion of time allows for a more profound sense of connection with
fossils as the visible remains of legendary creatures who still have a
living presence." 4 The view stands at variance with the Western no-
tion of fossils as merely the lifeless, physical remains of extinct animals
that are of interest because of their scientific or commercial value.
Anthropologists Ernest Wallace and E. Adamson Hoebel de-
scribed the Comanches' use of the madstone, or medicine bone, as a
treatment for wounds, infections, and boils.16 5 They described it as "a
small piece of the leg bone of the giant prehistoric mammoth be-
158. Id. at 68.
159. LAME DEER & ERoEs, supra note 3, at 112.
160. NEIHARDT, supra note 88, at 86.
161. SACRED PIPE, supra note 98, at 45.
162. Id. at 45 n.2. Lame Deer described Crazy Horse as having a "pebble behind his ear
which made him bulletproof." LAME DEER & ERDOES, supra note 3, at 166.
163. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (contrasting the Native American and
Western visions of time).
164. See, e.g., infra note 184 and accompanying text (describing a thunderbird's incarna-
tion as a voice of reassurance).
165. DAVID E. JONES, SANAPIA: COMMANCHE MEDICINE WoMAN 51 (1972).
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lieved by the Comanches to be the bones of... the cannibal owl,"' 66
which they placed over the affected spot, to "draw out the poison." 1
67
Another account describes a Comanche medicine woman's use of this
"bone medicine."' 68 In traditional Native American culture, the term
"medicine" means more than simply the curing of disease and the
healing of injuries. It encompasses "that which is mysterious, holy,
sacred, and supernatural."' 69 Medicine and religion are thus closely
interwoven, and the use of fossils in healing practices demonstrates
their religious significance.
Lame Deer described the use of fossils in Sioux ceremonies. Tiny
fossils and other rocks, called yuwipi, which are gathered by ants, are
considered sacred.'17 They are collected from anthills by medicine
men and placed inside ceremonial gourds and rattles.1 7' Fossils are
also included in the Crow medicine bundles. 71 In addition, Lame
Deer described a healing herb that is found among "prehistoric mon-
ster bones" in the South Dakota Badlands.'
73
The myths and legends of a number of tribes involve the fossils of
supernatural animals and gods. According to a Sioux myth, the water
monster Unktehi, or Unktegila, caused a great flood that drowned many
of the ancient people who had sought refuge on a high hill.' 74 The
pool formed from the blood of the flood victims turned to pipestone,
166. Id. at 51-52 (quoting ERNEST WALLACE & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE COMaNCHES:
LORDS OF THE SOUTH PLAINS 171 (1952)).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 51. The Comanche medicine woman Sanapia was interviewed extensively by
anthropologist David Jones in Oklahoma in the 1960s. At the time of the interviews,
Sanapia was the last surviving Comanche traditional medicine woman. Id. at 1. Sanapia
either ground the "bone medicine" into powder to form a topical solution, or moistened a
piece of bone and applied it to the afflicted area. Id. at 51. Sanapia used the bone
medicine to strengthen bones and to treat sprains. Id. In addition to using the term "bone
medicine," Sanapia also referred to the medicine as "big old giant." Id. at 50. The account
does not contain any further information on the nature of the fossilized bone that was
used.
169. MEDICINE CROW, supra note 137, at 112. This broader view of the meaning of
.medicine" is embraced by the Sioux word wakan and the word manitou, used by some of
the eastern tribes. Id.; see also supra note 102 (discussing the word wakan). Similarly, the
Comanche medicine woman Sanapia described herself as having puhta, a Comanche word
equated with both medicine and supernatural power. JONEs, supra note 165, at 2.
170. LAME DEER & ERDOES, supra note 3, at 135-36.
171. Id. Lame Deer described the use of these gourds in the yuwipi ceremony. Id. at
191-207.
172. IRwtN, supra note 109, at 224. These fossils were usually ammonites or baculites.
Id. Ammonites, or ammonoids, are a kind of mollusk. See RICHARD FORTEY, Fossius: THE
KEY TO THE PAST 72, 73-76 (1991) (explaining characteristics of ammonites). Baculites are
a kind of ammonite. Id. at 75.
173. LAME DEER & ERDors, supra note 3, at 177.
174. MYrHS AND LEGENDS, supra note 82, at 93-94.
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creating the sacred red pipestone quarry from which the stone for
pipe bowls is taken.175 Unktehi was likewise turned to stone, leaving
unmistakable petrified remains: "Her bones are in the Badlands now.
Her back forms a long, high ridge, and you can see her vertebrae
sticking out in a great row of red and yellow rocks." 17 6
According to the Sioux, the Badlands also contain the fossilized
remains of the thunder-beings, or thunderbirds. 177 The thunder-be-
ings originally lived on earth but later turned into winged creatures,
the wakinyan, or thunderbirds. 178 Their earthly bodies then turned to
stone, and "It]heir remains . . . are scattered throughout the Bad-
lands."179 Lame Deer described the role of the thunderbirds in the
destruction of Unktehi, the water monster.' 80 The thunder-beings also
played a prominent role in the great vision that Black Elk experienced
as a child. 8'
Lame Deer recounted his own childhood encounter with the pe-
trified bones of Unktehi and with the thunderbirds1i 2 One night,
Lame Deer was caught in a severe thunderstorm in the Badlands. 8 '
He climbed up onto a high ridge to avoid the flooding caused by the
heavy rain and hail and was comforted by the voices of the thunder-
birds, who told him not to be afraid. 8 4 When the storm ended and
dawn came, Lame Deer was surprised by the appearance of the ridge
to which he had been clinging:
175. Id. at 94; see also LM.E DEra & ERDoEs, supra note 3, at 136, 251-52, 261. The quarry
is located in southwestern Minnesota. Id. at 261; see also supra notes 141-146 and accompa-
nying text (describing the use of pipestone in the sacred pipes of the Plains tribes).
176. MYrns AND LEGENDS, supra note 82, at 94.
177. LAME DEER & ERDOES, supra note 3, at 252.
178. Id. The thunder-beings could manifest themselves in a number of forms, such as
lightning, thunder, eagles, and horses. IRWIN, supra note 109, at 53-55. Wakinyan Tanka,
the great thunderbird, was said to live on top of Harney Peak in the Black Hills, but Lame
Deer believed that he no longer did, "since the wasichu, the whites, have made these hills
into a vast Disneyland. No, I think the thunder beings have retreated to the farthest end of
the earth, where the sun goes down, where there are no tourists and hot-dog stands."
MYMS AND LEGENDS, supra note 82, at 218-19.
179. LAME DEER & ERDOES, supra note 3, at 252.
180. Wakinyan Tanka, the great thunderbird, and his children, the little thunderbirds,
fought to protect the people from the water monster Unktehi and her children, the little
water monsters. MYTrHs AND LEGENDS, supra note 82, at 219-20. After the water monsters
flooded the earth, killing all of its human inhabitants except the few who had taken refuge
on a high rock, the thunderbirds used their lightning bolts to set the earth on fire. Id. at
220. The water monsters "burned up and died, leaving only their dried bones in the Mako
Sicha, the Badlands, where their bones turned to rock." Id. at 221; see also supra notes 174-
176 and accompanying text (describing the water monsters).
181. NEIHARDT, supra note 88, at 22-47.





I saw that I was straddling a long row of petrified bones, the
biggest I had ever seen. I had been moving along the spine
of the Great Unktehi.... I scrambled down and ran toward
home.... I searched many times for the ridge deep inside
the Badlands that formed Unktehi's spine. I wanted to show
it to my friends, but I never found the ridge either.185
In the 1870s the Sioux shared their understanding of the fossils'
significance with a number of paleontologists and the soldiers who
accompanied them."8 6 Paleontologists used the Sioux descriptions of
the petrified bones of the "Thunder Horse" to locate fossils.1 1 7 They
took advantage of Sioux beliefs that disturbing the bones would be
sacrilegious in order to secure the fossils for themselves. 18 ' During
the same period of time, the Pawnee described the fossils in their ter-
ritory to paleontologists as the remains of an extinct race of giants."19
The paleontologists were interested in the fossils for their scien-
tific, rather than their religious, significance. Viewing the fossils
neither as sacred elements of the earth in which they rested, nor as
the remains of legendary creatures, the nineteenth century paleontol-
ogists, like their twentieth century counterparts, saw them as paleonto-
logical specimens, to be dug from the earth and removed from tribal
lands as quickly as possible.
III. "BONE MEDICINE-MEN": ENCOUNTERS ON THE FRONTIERS OF
PALEONTOLOGY
The opinions in the Black Hills case dealt in a matter-of-fact way
with the dealings between Maurice Williams and BHIGR, and treated
this encounter between a Native American and fossil collectors as if it
were an isolated incident. Viewed in its proper context, however, the
incident can be seen as only the latest encounter between Native
Americans and paleontologists in the western United States. Many of
these dealings have resulted in the removal of valuable fossils from
Indians lands, in some cases with the assistance of the federal govern-
ment, but without tribal consent.
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., infra notes 231-238 and accompanying text (describing the assistance given
by the army).
187. See infra note 247 and accompanying text (describing the use of the Thunder
Horse legend).
188. See, e.g., infra notes 275-276 and accompanying text (discussing Sioux views on
sacrilege).
189. See infra note 235 and accompanying text (discussing the beliefs of the Pawnee).
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Examining some of the encounters of Native Americans with pa-
leontologists and other scientists provides a better understanding of
the interests at stake in the Black Hills case. Moreover, this history,
beginning in the early nineteenth century, reveals that the taking of
fossils from Indian lands represents simply another aspect of the con-
quest of Native Americans and their lands.' 90 Reviewing the history of
these encounters is important when tribal rights are at stake because
those rights cannot be understood outside their historical context. As
Justice Blackmun wrote, "Too often we neglect the past. Even more
than other domains of law, 'the intricacies and peculiarities of Indian
law deman[d] an appreciation of history.'"191
A. First Encounters: Lewis and Clark and the Early Surveys
In 1805 the government expedition headed by army officers Mer-
iwether Lewis and William Clark, including their Indian guide Sa-
cajawea,192 reached Sioux country' 93 and traveled through the Judith
River Badlands of Montana. Although there were numerous fossil re-
mains located in bluffs high above the Judith River, Lewis and Clark
passed them in ignorance of the fossils' existence.' 94
The richness of the fossil fields on Sioux lands and elsewhere in
the West apparently first came to the attention of scientists in the mid-
dle of the nineteenth century. 195 Fur traders who had visited the
White River Badlands, located in the upper Missouri River area east of
the Black Hills-an area that had been guaranteed to the Sioux by
treaty1 96 -sent bone fragments back eastward as curiosities.197 Tribes
190. For a thorough analysis of the conquest of Native Americans and their lands, see
generally ROBERT M. WILLAMS, THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE
DIscouRsEs OF CONQUEST (1990).
191. South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 511-12 (1986) (quoting
Felix Frankfurter, Foreword to a Jurispnrdential Symposium in Memory of Felix S. Cohen, 9
RUTGERS L Rv. 355, 356 (1954)); see also Aviam Soifer, Objects in MirrorAre Closer Than They
Appear, 28 GA. L. Rxv. 533 (1994) (warning of the dangers from the abuse of history).
192. URL LANHAM, THE BONE HUNTERs: THE HEROIC AGE OF PALEONTOLOGY IN THE
AMERICAN WEST 4-5 (Dover Publications 1991) (1973). Sacajawea was a Shoshoni woman
who married Toussaint Charbonneau, a French Canadian who was employed by Lewis and
Clark as a guide and interpreter on their expedition. ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDI-
ANS OF THE UNITED STATES 85 (1970).
193. LAZARUS, supra note 78, at 9.
194. LANHAM, supra note 192, at 5.
195. Id. at 32; LAzARus, supra note 78, at 10-11.
196. LAZARUS, supra note 78, at 10.
197. LANHAM, supra note 192, at 13. The route followed by the trappers ran west from
Fort Pierre on the Missouri River for about 300 miles to Fort Laramie in southeastern
Wyoming. Id. This trail passed along the northern edge of the White River Badlands and
their rich fossil beds. Id. at 32; see also HENRY F. OSBORN, COPE: MASTER NATURAuST: THE
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in the area had long known of the existence of these remains and
regarded the fossils as the remains of the legendary "Thunder
Horse." 198 After the publication in 1846 of the first scientific paper
describing the fossilized remains of what paleontologists named a "Ti-
tanothere," visitors to the Badlands area of South Dakota, as well as to
Nebraska and Wyoming, regularly took fossils from Indian lands back
to eastern paleontologists, who began to organize collecting expedi-
tions. 99 For example, geologistJohn Evans, whose party included an
Indian guide and interpreter, made a reconnaissance of the fossil
beds in 1849 and returned for an additional fossil-hunting expedition
in 1853.200
B. Paleontology and the U.S. Army: Hayden and Warren
In 1854 U.S. soldiers shot and killed the Brule Sioux Chief Con-
quering Bear near Fort Laramie, Wyoming, and hostilities broke out
between the Sioux and the United States. 0 1 Ferdinand Hayden, an
amateur paleontologist, was searching for fossils in Sioux territory at
the time and continued his fossil hunting in spite of the apparent dan-
ger.20 2 Known by the Indians as "'the man who picks up stones while
running,"' Hayden was considered insane and therefore a person not
to be harmed.20 3 According to one account, his apparent madness
was believed to render him "safe from the wrath of the Great Spirit
which smote any man in his right senses who became so inadvised as
to disturb the great bones of 'Thunder Horse'; he was consequently
able to visit fossil grounds otherwise safeguarded by Indian supersti-
tion."204 This account suggests that disturbing the fossils was consid-
ered sacrilegious, and that Hayden was able to take advantage of the
LIFE AND LETTERS OF EDWARD DRINKER COPE WITH A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF His WRITINGS CLASSI-
FIED By SUBJECT 19 (1931) [hereinafter OSBORN I] (discussing locations of fossil findings).
198. HENRY F. OSBORN, 1 THE TITANOTHERES OF ANCIENT WYOMING, DAKOTA AND NE-
BRASKA at xxi (U.S. Geological Survey Monograph No. 55, 1929) [hereinafter OSBORN II];
see also OSBORN I, supra note 197, at 19-21; infra note 247 and accompanying text (describ-
ing the Thunder Horse legend).
199. LANHAM, supra note 192, at 19-22; OSBORN I, supra note 197, at 21.
200. LANHAM, supra note 192, at 33-34. He described the richness of the fossil beds as
follows: "At every step, objects of the highest interest present themselves. Embedded in
the debris, lie strewn, in the greatest profusion, organic relics of extinct animals." Id. at 33.
For a map showing the locations of the major western tribes in 1850, see ROBERT M. UTLEY,
THE INDIAN FRONTIER OF THE AMERICAN WEST 1846-1890, at 5 (1984).
201. The incident is described in LAZARUS, supra note 78, at 21-22.
202. LANHAM, supra note 192, at 35.
203. Id.; see also RICHARD A. BARTLETr, GREAT SURVEYS OF THE AMERICAN WEST 4 (1962)
(recounting how Hayden began collecting geological specimens in the 1850s).
204. OSBORN I, supra note 197, at 21.
112 [VOL. 55:84
SCIENCE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE SACRED TEXT
belief that he was insane to obtain the fossils he desired. 20 5 On some
of his expeditions Hayden was accompanied by an Indian guide. 206
Hayden also collaborated with Gouverneur Kemble Warren of
the Army Corps of Topographical Engineers in exploring Sioux coun-
try and preparing a geographical report on the area for the federal
government. 20 7 Hayden vividly described the White River area of
South Dakota in which he hunted for fossils:
All around us were bare, naked whitened walls, with now and
then a conical pyramid standing alone. We felt very much as
though we were in a sepulchre, and, indeed, we were in a
cemetary [sic] of a pre-Adamite age, for all around us at the
base of these walls and pyramids were heads and tails, and
fragments of the same, of species of which are not known to
exist at the present day....
Contrasted with most of the country on the upper Mis-
souri, the White river valley is a paradise, and the Indians
consider it one of the choice spots of the earth.2 °8
In the report provided to Congress in 1855, Warren sought funding
for further exploration of the Sioux country, before the still peaceful
Indians in the more remote areas "'became maddened by the en-
croachments of the white man. '' 20 9 Warren and Hayden received
funding that enabled them to make additional explorations of Sioux
lands in 1856 and 1857.211 In addition to surveying the area, they
collected and removed large quantities of fossils and animal skins.21'
Warren and Hayden's 1857 expedition was ordered by the War
Department,2 1 2 and thus demonstrates the role of the federal govern-
ment, including federal military authorities, in facilitating the removal
of fossils from Indian lands, and the reciprocal role of the paleontolo-
gists and other scientists in furthering military goals. The goals of the
205. Id.
206. LANHAM, supra note 192, at 38.
207. Id. at 35-37. Hayden visited the Dakota area with Warren in 1856 and 1857. BART-
LrTr, supra note 203, at 7. Warren had traveled in Sioux territory with the U.S. Army in its
1855 campaign against the Sioux. LANHAM, supra note 192, at 35.
208. LNHAM, supra note 192, at 38-39 (quoting Hayden's report on his activities from
1853-55, which was appended to the report published by Warren).
209. Id. at 39.
210. Id. In 1856 they explored the Missouri River from Fort Pierre (near the present-
day city of Pierre, South Dakota) to Fort Union, at the mouth of the Yellowstone River (on
the border between present-day North Dakota and Montana), and part of the Yellowstone
River to some distance beyond the mouth of the Powder River (in present-day Montana).
Id. at 40.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 42.
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expedition were to find new routes for wagon roads north of Ne-
braska's Platte River, and to explore the Black Hills. 13 Warren and
Hayden traveled into the northern part of the Black Hills, where they
encountered a large force of Dakota Sioux who, as Warren described,
"'made such earnest remonstrances and threats against our proceed-
ing into their country that I did not think it prudent for us, as a scien-
tific expedition, to venture further in this direction.'" 14 While the
scientists were concerned about long-dead animals in the area, in the
form of fossilized remains, the Sioux were concerned about the area's
living animals. 1' The grounds of the Sioux's objections, which War-
ren's later report on the encounter termed "very sensible," were that if
the expedition had proceeded any further, it would have deflected to
the west the buffalo that the Sioux had herded together, and pre-
vented them from laying in the stock of provisions and hides on which
the tribe's survival through the winter depended.216 The Sioux also
pointed out that the scientists had no right to travel in the area.217
The most recent treaty had allowed the whites the privilege of travel-
ing on the Platte River and along the White River, and of making
roads there, but had guaranteed that white people could not travel
elsewhere in Sioux country.2 18 Moreover, the purpose of the expedi-
tion was to determine whether the country was of value to the
whites.219 As the Sioux already had given up all the land that they
could spare, they felt that the Black Hills must be left to the Sioux
alone. 220 Finally, the Sioux were concerned that the knowledge of
their territory gained by the expedition could be used in later military
campaigns.22 1 Warren's report on his explorations of Sioux country
downplayed the military value of the road between Fort Pierre and
213. Id.
214. Id. (quoting Warren's report).
215. Id. at 43.
216. Id. at 42-43. Warren described the Sioux's sentiments as follows: "'Their feelings
towards us, under the circumstances, were not unlike what we should feel towards a person
who should insist upon setting fire to our barns.'" Id. at 43 (quoting Warren's report).
217. Id. at 43-44.
218. Id. The 1851 Treaty of Fort Laramie recognized Sioux dominion from the Missouri
River in the east to beyond the Black Hills, and from the Platte River north to the Heart
River in North Dakota. LAzARus, supra note 78, at 18. For a map of the land guaranteed in
the 1851 Treaty, see id. at xvii-xix. The treaty lands encompassed parts of present-day Ne-
braska, Wyoming, Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota. Id.
219. LANwAM, supra note 192, at 44.
220. Id.; see also LAzARus, supra note 78, at 24 (explaining Sioux concerns about the
expedition).
221. LANHUM supra note 192, at 44. Warren noted that he felt "compelled to admit to
[him]self the truth and force of these objections." Id.
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Fort Laramie through the White River Badlands, which shifted the
federal government's focus to other areas.222
During the remainder of the 1850s and the 1860s, instead of en-
countering small groups of paleontologists in search of fossils, the
Sioux more regularly confronted intruders in search of different min-
eral resources. 223 The discovery of gold at Pike's Peak in Colorado in
1859, for example, brought a new flood of white intruders, many of
whom passed through Sioux territory on their way to Colorado.224 In
1861 gold was discovered in Montana, causing new streams of whites
to invade the rangelands of the great bison herd on which the western
Sioux depended for their livelihood." 5 The visits of relatively small
parties of paleontologists and other scientists may have seemed less
threatening to tribal interests than the onslaught of these new fortune
hunters, yet the paleontologists shared with these new intruders a pro-
pensity for ignoring tribal sovereignty and treaty rights when it was in
their best interest to do so.
C. The Bone Medicine-Man: Othniel Charles Marsh
Eastern paleontologists again focused on the rich fossil beds on
western Indian lands during the 1870s,2 2 6 when Edward Drinker Cope
and Othniel Charles Marsh, two of the foremost American paleontolo-
gists of the nineteenth century, developed an intense professional ri-
valry and competition over the latest fossil discoveries.227 Like the
settlers seeking Indian lands for farming or ranching, and the miners
seeking precious metals on Indian lands, Marsh and Cope staked out
222. Id. at 45.
223. LAZARUS, supra note 78, at 25.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 26-27. Given the increasing incursions by whites, among other Sioux griev-
ances, conflict apparently was inevitable and the Sioux wars broke out in 1862. Id. at 27; see
Carol Chomsky, The United States-Dakota War Trials: A Study in Militay Injustice, 43 STAN. L.
REv. 13, 15-22 (1990) (describing the initial outbreak of war, involving the Santee Sioux of
Minnesota). In the aftermath of the war, 38 Sioux men were hanged in the largest mass
execution in United States history. Id. at 13. For an analysis of the war trials that led to
these hangings, see id. at 22-28. See also LAZARUs, supra note 78, at 27-28 (describing the
Sioux wars). The hostilities spread into the territory of the western Teton Sioux when
government troops followed fleeing Santee Sioux westward. Id. at 28. For another account
of the hostilities in Minnesota, see BROWN, supra note 2, at 37-65.
226. The Civil War largely disrupted the geological and paleontological expeditions.
Ferdinand Hayden, who was a physician, served in the Union Army as a physician. BART-
LETT, supra note 203, at 8. The end of the war brought what one writer has described as "a
tremendous expansive impulse. The West seemed the obvious place for investment, for
settlement, for exploitation, for health." Id. at xii.
227. The bitter rivalry between Cope and Marsh is described in JOHN N. WILFORD, THE
RIDDLE OF THE DINOSAUR 90-109 (1986).
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their own claims to the natural resources in which they were most
interested,2 and "opened up the West" in their own way.229
Between 1870 and 1873, Marsh, a Yale University paleontology
professor, led four expeditions of Yale students to the West.230 With
the assistance of influential Yale alumni in Washington, D.C., Marsh
was able to obtain provisions from army garrisons and cavalry escorts
for the expeditions. 211 Military escorts were deemed necessary be-
cause of the belief that "the country was full of Indians, most of them
still resentful of their steadily narrowing hunting grounds and ready
to harass any white man whom they might safely attack."23 2 Two Paw-
nee guides accompanied the 1870 expedition.233 One of the students
later wrote an account of the 1870 expedition's arrival in western
Nebraska:
The guides rode about a mile in advance of the column.
The major pointed out the least difficult paths; while the In-
dians, with movements characteristic of their wary race, crept
up each high bluff, and from behind a bunch of grass peered
over the top for signs of hostile savages .... As night closed
over our geologists, cut off from civilization, in a country in-
228. John Noble Wilford has described the spirit of the times:
[P]rofessional paleontologists and their hired collectors... brought to the hunt
[for fossils] an acquisitive fervor that mirrored the expansionary times. The Indi-
ans were being battled into submission, the buffalo slaughtered, and the land
fenced off for range and the plow. The new transcontinental railroad brought in
settlers and fortune seekers by the droves. The dinosaur hunters, in the spirit of
the time and place, staked out their own claims and guarded them jealously,
sometimes belligerently, and grubbed for a measure of fame and fortune.
Id. at 94.
229. Id. at 109.
230. LANHAM, supra note 192, at 80-85; CHARLES SCHUCHERT & CLARA M. LEVENE, O.C.
MARSH: PIONEER IN PALEONTOLOGY 94-138 (1940).
231. WILFoRD, supra note 227, at 97. Marsh first had visited the West in 1868. LANHAM,
supra note 192, at 179. A "flare-up of Indian hostilities" made an expedition that he had
planned for 1869 impossible. Id. at 80; see also SCHUCHERT & LEVENE, supra note 230, at 100
(noting that Marsh gave up his plan for a systematic exploration of the western plains
because of the imminence of the Indian wars).
232. SCHUCHERT & LEVENE, supra note 230, at 101.
233. Id. at 102. Marsh's biographers identified the guides as Tuck-he-ge-louhs ("Duel-
list") and La-oodle-sock ("Best of all"). Id. They also noted that "[t]he Pawnees were as a
rule well disposed toward the whites, but battles between them and the warlike Sioux were
frequent." Id. at 103. The Pawnees' traditional homeland was on the Kansas River in Kan-
sas and on the Platte and Republican Rivers in Nebraska. DEBO, supra note 192, at 11.
William F. "Buffalo Bill" Cody also accompanied the expedition for a day and became a
friend of Marsh. SCHUCHERT & LEVENE, supra note 230, at 103.
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fested by hostile Indians, ... they felt "in for" something
more than science.M
According to this account, the soldiers participated in the fossil hunt-
ing itself:
The soldiers not only relieved us from all fear of surprise, but
soon became interested and successful assistants; but the su-
perstition of the Pawnees deterred them for a time from sci-
entific pursuits; for Indians believe that the petrified bones
of their country are the remains of an extinct race of
giants.23
5
Accounts of the expeditions make clear that the tribes through whose
territory the expeditions were traveling generally did not welcome the
paleontologists and their military escorts with open arms.236 The pale-
ontologists, in turn, did their best to take surreptitiously what they
wanted from the land with as little contact as possible with the re-
237gion's native inhabitants, except when such contact, as with the
Pawnee guides, was advantageous to the expeditions.23 8 The numer-
ous boxes of fossils gathered on these expeditions-without any con-
sideration given to the rights of the tribes from whose lands they were
taken-laid the foundation of Yale University's outstanding collection
of fossil vertebrates. 239
Marsh's 1874 expedition to the White River Badlands south of
the Black Hills yielded two tons of fossils, 2  and resulted in an inter-
esting encounter between Marsh and the great Sioux leader Red
234. SCHUCHERT & LEVENE, supra note 230, at 104 (quoting Charles Betts's account in
HARPERS NEW MONTHLY MAG., Oct. 1871, at 663-71).
235. Id. at 105. The account claimed that the Pawneesjoined in the collecting after "the
professor, picking up the fossil jaw of a horse, showed how it corresponded with their own
horses' mouths. From that time they barely returned to camp without bringing fossils for
the 'Bone Medicine-man'." Id. This account does not explain whether Marsh convinced
the Pawnees that the fossils were bones from modern horses rather than from legendary
creatures, and that therefore disturbing them was not sacrilegious; or whether he over-
came the Pawnees' "superstition" by persuading them that, given the similarity between the
fossils and horse bones, they should not regard the fossils as having any special
significance.
236. See id. at 104-38.
237. Id.
238. In addition to relying on Pawnee guides, the expeditions also relied on Indian
accounts of the location of fossils. See, e.g., id. at 110 (noting the reliance on Indian tales).
239. Id. at 137-38. Marsh collected 36 boxes of fossils during the 1870 expedition, id. at
120, and 49 boxes during the 1873 expedition, id. at 137. In 1898 Marsh gave his personal
collections of fossils to Yale. Id. at 326-30.
240. LANHAM, supra note 192, at 85. After the 1874 expedition, Marsh relied on paid




Cloud. When Red Cloud and Marsh met in November 1874, Red
Cloud complained to Marsh of fraud by the government agent in
charge of distributing to the Sioux the goods and supplies to which
they were entitled by treaty. 41 Red Cloud gave Marsh samples of
some of the supplies to demonstrate their inferior quality.2 4 2 Marsh
agreed to deliver Red Cloud's complaints to Washington, in order to
obtain Red Cloud's permission to pass through Sioux lands.2 4' Red
Cloud apparently realized that as a wealthy white easterner, Marsh was
in a better position than Red Cloud himself to draw public attention
to the inferior goods and supplies being provided to the Sioux, and to
persuade federal authorities to address the situation. In addition,
General Custer's recent discovery of gold in the Black Hills244 appar-
ently made the Sioux suspicious of Marsh's interest in the area.245 As
one contemporary editorial explained, Marsh had realized that "in or-
der to get at his beloved hipparions and pterodactyles he must cove-
241. WILFORD, supra note 227, at 98. In 1868 the Sioux had signed a treaty with the
United States that set aside all of present-day South Dakota west of the Missouri River,
including the Black Hills, "'for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupancy of the
Sioux.'" LAzARus, supra note 78, at 48. This area later became known as the Great Sioux
Reservation. Id. The treaty also designated the area north and west of the reservation near
the Powder River-"'north of the North Platte River and east of the summits of the Big
Horn Mountains'"--as "unceded Indian territory," which white men could not enter with-
out Indian consent, and preserved Sioux hunting rights on additional lands south and west
of the reservation. Id.; see also id. at 433-49 (reprinting in its entirety 15 Stat. 635 (1869)).
For a map of the Great Sioux Reservation and other Sioux lands defined in the 1868 treaty,
see id. at xx-xxi. See also infra note 400 and accompanying text (discussing the treaty
provisions). _-
242. JAMES N. OLSON, RED CLOUD AND THE SIOUX PROBLEM 179 (1965); see also
SCHUCHERT & LEVENE, supra note 230, at 145.
243. LANHAM, supra note 192, at 149; see also SCHUCHERT & LEVENE, supra note 230, at
143-55 (recounting Marsh's encounter with Red Cloud and Marsh's subsequent delivery of
Red Cloud's complaints to Washington).
244. OLSON, supra note 242, at 171-72. In July 1874 an army expedition led by Custer
found gold in the Black Hills, and the discovery set off a rush of fortune hunters to the
area. LAzARUs, supra note 78, at 75-76. Even as early as Lewis and Clark's expedition, the
Black Hills were rumored to be goldbearing. Id. at 73. The Sioux were aware of the exist-
ence of gold, but had tried to keep it secret to avoid a flood of white miners into an area
they regarded as sacred. Id. The army had invited Marsh to accompany Custer's expedi-
tion because it would pass through fossil fields, but Marsh sent two naturalists in his place.
SCHUCHERT & LEVENE, supra note 230, at 142 & n.3.
245. LANHAM, supra note 192, at 149; see also SCHUCHERT & LEVENE, supra note 230, at
143 (discussing the Indians' disbelief that Marsh was only in search of bones). Marsh's
biographers claimed that the fossil field was not within any reservation, yet it appears to
have been located in the "unceded Indian territory," which, according to the 1868 treaty,
no white man could pass through without the consent of the Sioux. Id. at 140, 143; see also
supra note 241 (describing the treaty of 1868). According to Schuchert and LeVene,
Marsh and his team, fearing the loss of Sioux consent, actually left camp and collected the
fossils under cover of darkness. SCHUCHERT & LEVENE, supra note 230, at 144-45.
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nant with the legitimate owners thereof."246 Marsh relied on Sioux stories
of the Thunder Horse that lived "'away back'" and would sometimes
come down to earth in a thunderstorm and kill buffalo, and once had
driven a herd of buffalo into a Sioux camp to save the people from
starvation. 47 Marsh named some of the huge mammal fossils that he
was finding "Brontotherium gigas," meaning the "great thunder
beast. " 2 4 8
After completing his collecting, Marsh took Red Cloud's samples
home with him and conveyed Red Cloud's complaints to the Commis-
sioner for Indian Affairs, the Board of Indian Commissioners, Presi-
dent Grant, and the public.2 49 Because Marsh was well known and his
charges received extensive publicity, it was impossible for the govern-
ment to ignore them.25° The Board appointed a committee to investi-
gate the charges. 51 Marsh met with the Board and appeared before
the committee, 5 2 which ultimately issued a 929-page report recom-
mending that the agent be removed and that government contract
246. SCHUCHERT & LEVENE, supra note 230, at 157 (quoting an editorial by Henry Ward
Beecher in the CH JSTIAN UNION, July 1875) (emphasis added).
247. OSBORN II, supra note 198, at xxi (quoting Capt. James H. Cook, Sketches of the
Life of Red Cloud (manuscript)).
248. SCHUCHERT & LEVENE, supra note 230, at 481. The Brontotheres were also called
"Titanotheres." Id. Marsh found the first of these fossils on his 1872 expedition. Id.; see
also supra note 199 and accompanying text (describing the Titanotheres).
249. See LANHAM, supra note 192, at 150; SCHUCHERT & LEVENE, supra note 230, at 146-
47. Concern about corruption in the Indian Bureau led to the creation of the Board of
Indian Commissioners, which shared control over Indian expenditures with the Interior
Department. SCHUCHERT & LEVENE, supra note 230, at 147 n.9, 160; see also id. at 146
(describing corruption in the Indian Bureau and the Grant Administration).
250. OLSON, supra note 242, at 189. For a description of the publicity, see id. at 191.
Marsh served as president of the National Academy of Sciences and as vertebrate paleon-
tologist for the United States Geological Survey, and thus became known within both the
government and the scientific community. WnFO.RD, supra note 227, at 107.
251. SCHUCHERT & LEVENE, supra note 230, at 152; see also OLSON, supa note 242, at 179
(discussing the investigation into Red Cloud's complaints).
252. OLSON, supra note 242, at 192. For a description of the committee and its activities,
see id. at 189-98. The 1875 Annual Report of the Board of Indian Commissioners de-
scribed Marsh's role as follows:
[T]he attention of the board, at its meeting in New York, was more specifically
called to the statements of Prof. 0. C. Marsh, containing allegations of the gravest
character in respect to fraudulent practices and irregularities in the management
of the Red Cloud agency. On the invitation of the board, Professor Marsh visited
New York, and in an interview of considerable length gave in detail the circum-
stances on which his allegations were based.
SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF INDIAN COMMISSIONERS FOR THE YEAR 1875, at 12
(1876) [hereinafter SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF INDIAN COMMISSIONERS].
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procedures be tightened. 53 The incident also led to the resignation
of the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner for Indian Af-
fairs.254 After the conclusion of the investigation, Red Cloud sent
Marsh a pipe, and in 1883 spent three days at Marsh's New Haven,
Connecticut, home."'
D. The Bone Medicine-Man's Rival: Edward Drinker Cope
Edward Drinker Cope, Marsh's fossil-hunting rival, made exten-
sive excavations on Indian lands.256 He made his first western trip in
1871, visiting the fossil fields of Cheyenne territory in western Kansas,
where soldiers were able to point out the best localities for fossil hunt-
ing.257 Cope also worked with Ferdinand Hayden on a government-
sponsored geological survey of the West, which gave Cope the oppor-
tunity to collect fossils on the lands being surveyed.258 In 1876 Cope
hunted for fossils in the Judith River Badlands of central Montana,2 59
which was the neutral ground between the Sioux and the Crow.26
After arriving in Helena, Montana, to begin his expedition, Cope
learned of the Sioux defeat of General Custer at the Little Bighorn
253. OLSON, supra note 242, at 195-96; SCHUCHERT & LEVENE, supra note 230, at 164.
The 1875 Annual Report summarizes the recommendations of the commission. SEVENTH
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF INDIAN COMMISSIONERS, supra note 252, at 10-11.
254. OLSON, supra note 242, at 196-97; see also SCHUCHERT & LEVENE, supra note 230, at
164-66 (discussing the aftermath of the investigation).
255. SCHUCHERT & LEVENE, supra note 230, at 166-68.
256. See generally OSBORN I, supra note 197, at 159-312.
257. Id. at 159, 162. Cope also made other trips to the West in the early 1870s. Id. at
183-96. In 1872 he hunted fossils in southwestern Wyoming, id. at 183, and in 1873 he
visited Colorado and Wyoming, id. at 194. He wrote home that the Indians were "peacea-
ble with the whites," but the Arapahos and the Utes were at war. Id. at 196 (quoting letter
from Cope to his father, Alfred Cope (July 18, 1873)). In 1874 he explored New Mexico as
a member of a government geological survey team, id. at 198, and while there met the
Pueblo Indians, whom he regarded as "very good fellows," id. at 204. In a letter to his
father, Cope wrote that he was trying to learn whether the Pueblo Indians "have been
semicivilized by the 'peace policy' of the Jesuits, or whether they are descendants of a once
civilized nation.... [The] evidence favors the former view." Id. at 210 (quoting letter from
Cope to Alfred Cope (Aug. 29, 1874)). He also reported pleasant conversations with Ute
and Apache chiefs. Id. at 211.
258. LANHAM, supra note 192, at 110; see also WiLFoRD, supra note 227, at 107-08 (discuss-
ing Cope's involvement with the government geological team, and subsequent difficulties).
For a description of some of Hayden's activities in the West, see supra notes 202-222 and
accompanying text. Cope published the research stemming from his participation in the
Hayden survey in a comprehensive volume entitled Vertebrata of the Tertiary Formations of the
West, which is still in use and is known by paleontologists as "Cope's bible." WiLFoRD, supra
note 227, at 108.
259. W-uFoRD, supra note 227, at 99.
260. Id. at 100.
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River in Montana. 61 Cope was warned that he should not proceed to
the Badlands because members of the expedition might be killed by
the Sioux or the Crow. 62 Cope ignored this advice, reasoning that
because the Sioux were elsewhere with their leader Sitting Bull, the
expedition should have nearly three months in which to collect fossils
"in peace. " 211 Members of the Crow, Piegan, Blood, and Gros Ventre
Tribes visited the expedition.2 64 Cope collected 1700 pounds of fos-
sils,2 63 and did not limit his collecting activities to dinosaur bones, as
he described in a letter written on board a Missouri River steamer:
[A] day or so ago I gathered a number of skulls and skele-
tons of Sioux with a bag of tools buried with a chief, and
brought them to the boat and boxed them. The uproar it
created among the poor white element that run the lesser
offices scared the captain so that he ordered them all taken
back to the place where I obtained them. He... said that I
had "immolated the graves of the dead."... [T] he bones had
to go. But I have a little bill of $120 for the bones .... It is
not a nice job, taking dirty skulls from skeletons not carefully pre-
pared, and it is done at some risk to life. So I am indignant
266
Cope had, however, packed about a dozen other human skulls in
among the fossils,2 67 which apparently he was able to take home with
him. Cope continued his fossil-collecting activities in the western
United States during the remainder of the 1870s.2 68
In 1889 Cope suffered a fate similar to what was to befall BHIGR
over a century later. The Secretary of the Interior demanded that
261. CHiaRLs H. STERNBERG, THE LIFE OF A FOSSIL HUNTER 63 (Indiana University Press
1990) (1909); WILFoRD, supra note 227, at 99-100. For one description of the battle, in-
cluding excerpts from eyewitness accounts, see BROWN, supra note 2, at 290-97. For a de-
scription of the aftermath of the battle, see id. at 297-313. See asoANDRIsT, supra note 108,
at 286-94 (describing "Custer's last stand").
262. STERNBERG, supra note 261, at 63-64.
263. Id. at 64; see also WILoFRD, supra note 227, at 100 (describing Cope's 1876 expedi-
tion); LANHAM, supra note 192, at 159 (discussing activities at the outset of the 1876
expedition).
264. LkNH~s, supra note 192, at 159.
265. OSBORN I, supra note 197, at 228 (quoting letter from Cope to his wife, Annie Pim
Cope (Oct. 8, 1874)).
266. Id. at 230-31 (quoting letter from Cope to his sister (Oct. 21, 1876)) (emphasis
added).
267. STERNBERG, supra note 261, at 95.
268. For descriptions of his activities during these years, see OSBORN I, supra note 197, at
233-73. Financial difficulties limited Cope's opportunities for expeditions after 1879. Id.




Cope deliver part of his fossil collection to the United States National
Museum, on the grounds that Cope had accumulated the fossils dur-
ing his participation in a government expedition and that the fossils
therefore were government property.269 Despite this setback, Cope
made another expedition, sponsored by the Texas Geological Survey,
to northwest Texas in 1892.270
On his way back from the Texas expedition, Cope made a fossil-
hunting expedition to northern South Dakota, an area that paleontol-
ogists had not visited since 1862, "partly because it was well within the
Sioux Indian reservation." 271 He discovered that "[t]he Sioux have
been lately angered by trespassers on their reservation who have sto-
len their horses and cattle, and they are very suspicious of white peo-
ple who want to go on their land,"272 and was careful to avoid Sioux
settlements. 273 His search for fossils was guided by Sioux stories that
the bones of giants lay near the Grand River. 74 Cope described the
Sioux "superstitions" and his visit to the site, to which he induced a
Sioux child to take him, in a letter:
The Sioux knew of [the site] long ago, but they believed that
the bones belonged to evil monsters which were slain by
lightening [sic] by the Great Spirit. They would not touch
the bones for fear that a like fate would befall them. So they
were fortunately preserved for the more intelligent white man who is
not troubled by such superstitions. But the Indian might have
support for his opinion, if lightening [sic] would furnish it.
It played across the sky in forked streams, or occasionally de-
scended to the earth in blinding bolts.27 5
The lightning did not, however, "avenge the disturbance of the bones
of its ancient victims," and Cope was able to dig them up and take
them away. 276 The site had "numerous bones of giants nearly en-
269. Id. at 402, 404; WnLoRo, supra note 227, at 108. Cope later had to sell many of his
remaining fossils to the American Museum of Natural History in New York to support
himself. Id. at 109. The federal government also made sure that it obtained the fossils that
Marsh had collected during government expeditions. SCHUCHERT & LEVENE, supra note
230, at 277-89.
270. LANHAm, supra note 192, at 267. For a detailed account of this expedition, see
OSBORN I, supra note 197, at 413-35.
271. OSBORN I, supra note 197, at 414.
272. Id. at 429 (quoting letter from Cope to Annie Pim Cope (July 17, 1892)).
273. Id. at 430. Cope also obtained a government permit from the reservation agent.
Id. at 429.
274. Id. at 432.
275. Id. (emphasis added).
276. Id.
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tire,"277 and proved to be one of the richest deposits of reptile fossils
of Cope's entire career.278 Cope visited North Dakota, South Dakota,
Wyoming, Oklahoma, Texas, and Kansas in 1893.279 As in the previ-
ous year, Cope successfully relied on Indian stories to locate fossils. 2 80
The fossils that Cope collected on his western expeditions ultimately
enriched the collections of a number of museums, including the
American Museum of Natural History in New York.2 81
IV. TRIBAL REGULATION OF PALEONTOLOGICAL RESOURCES
Congress has enacted a number of statutes providing for the reg-
ulation of archaeological resources.28 2 In the Archaeological Re-
sources Protection Act of 1979 (ARPA)283 and the Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 (NAGPRA),28 4 Con-
gress specifically recognized certain tribal rights and interests with re-
spect to archaeological resources found on reservation lands. 85
Congress has not, however, enacted any statute aimed at regulating
paleontological resources, 28 6 let alone recognized any particular tribal
277. Id. at 431. Cope noted that he "could hardly walk without stepping on them." Id.
278. Id. at 415.
279. Id. at 436-37.
280. Id. at 440 (quoting letter from Cope to Julia Cope (July 25, 1893)); id. at 441-42
(quoting letter from Cope to Annie Pim Cope (Aug. 10, 1893)). Cope also noted in a
letter home the "progress" that was being made with the Indians: "[T]he Indians here
have every inducement to be good. An Indian department which feeds them and schools
them; missions to convert and school them, and an army to whip them if they are bad; it is
no wonder that they are generally good at present." Id. at 438 (quoting letter from Cope to
Annie Pim Cope (July 15, 1893)).
281. Id. at 44647, 452-53.
282. See, e.g., Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1988); Historic Sites Act of
1935, 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-467 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); National Historic Preservation Act of
1966, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470t (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Archaeological Resources Protection
Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (Supp. V 1993).
283. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm.
284. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013.
285. See infra notes 417-428, 429-441 and accompanying text (discussing ARPA and
NAGPRA, respectively).
286. See Duffy & Lofgren, supra note 9, at 487 (discussing the void created by Congress's
lack of regulation); Lazerwitz, supra note 11, at 603. ARPA regulates paleontological re-
sources only if they are found in an archaeological context. 16 U.S.C. § 470bb. In Black
Hills 1, 967 F.2d 1237, 1239 (8th Cir. 1992), the government originally alleged that
BHIGR's actions violated the Antiquities Act of 1906. The government later decided not
to rely on the Antiquities Act. Duffy & Lofgren, supra note 9, at 489 n.91. In what is
apparently the only case in which the Antiquities Act was applied to fossils, the United
States District Court for the District of Montana dismissed the charges against the defend-
ant on the ground that the Act was unconstitutional. United States v. Jenkins, No. CR-74-
63-BLG, slip op. (D. Mont. Jan. 13, 1975) (order dismissing case), reprinted in COMMITTEE
ON GUIDELINES FOR PALEONTOLOGICAL COLLECTING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, PALE-
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fights or interests in such resources. A number of commentators have
argued that there is a need for comprehensive federal regulation of
paleontological resources, at least with respect to federal lands.28 7
Part IV of this Article discusses tribal authority to regulate paleon-
tological resources on reservation lands, against the backdrop of the
discussion of traditional Native American attitudes toward the land
and fossils in Part II and the history of fossil collecting on Indian lands
in Part III. Tribal regulatory authority over paleontological resources
on reservation lands is appropriate for a number of reasons.
In the first place, tribal governments, as sovereign entities, should
have regulatory authority over all land and paleontological resources
within reservation boundaries on the basis of retained tribal sover-
eignty, reinforced by treaty guarantees. Recent Supreme Court deci-
sions, however, have weakened tribal regulatory authority over the
conduct of non-Indians on non-Indian reservation land. 88 Second,
ONTOLOGICAL COLLECTING 96-107 (1987) [hereinafter NAS REPORT]. For related court
documents in Jenkins, see NAS REPORT, supra, at 96-106. In 1974 the Ninth Circuit held
that the Antiquities Act was unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113,
115 (9th Cir. 1974). The decision rendered the Act useless in the very circuit that includes
the states in which the majority of antiquities are discovered. See Marc Villareal & Elaine
Zacharakis, Note, "Where Did You Dig Up That Old Fossil?": Will Universities Own the Research
Specimens That They Collect or Purchase?, 20J.C. & U.L. 225, 233 (1993). But see United States
v. Smyer, 596 F.2d 939, 941 (10th Cir. 1979) (upholding the Act's constitutionality). For
discussions of the Act's constitutionality and its application to paleontological resources,
see Duffy & Lofgren, supra note 9, at 489-94. Lazerwitz, supra note 11, at 609-11; Villareal &
Zacharakis, supra, at 231-33; see also Lazerwitz, supra note 11, at 609-20 (analyzing the appli-
cation of a number of federal statutes and regulations to paleontological resources on
federal lands).
287. See, e.g., 138 CONG. REc. S10,933 (daily ed.July 30, 1992) (statement of Sen. Baucus
introducing Vertebrate Paleontological Resources Protection Act); Lazerwitz, supra note
11, at 635-36 (discussing the Act). The Vertebrate Paleontological Resources Protection
Act (VPRPA), which was introduced in the Senate in 1992 as Senate Bill 3107 but not
enacted, provided for federal management of paleontological resources on "lands owned
or controlled by the federal government." S. 3107, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(5) (1992). It
contained a finding that "each Indian tribe should adopt a uniform policy on paleontologi-
cal collecting on the lands of the tribe." Id. § 2(13); see Lazerwitz, supra note 11, at 625-35
(analyzing the VPRPA).
288. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1993) (holding that the
Flood Control Act and the Cheyenne River Act abrogated the power of the Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe to regulate non-Indian use of former trust land); Brendale v. Confederated
Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 421-23 (1989) (holding that
the Yakima Indian Nation does not have the power to zone fee lands owned by nonmem-
bers within reservation areas that are open to the public); Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544, 557-67 (1981) (declining to recognize tribal authority to regulate hunting and
fishing by all individuals everywhere within the external boundaries of the reservation).
For a discussion of Bourland, Brendale, and Montana, see Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-
Based and Membership-Based Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court's Changing
Vision, 55 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 58-78 (1993) [hereinafter Dussias I].
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tribal regulation is appropriate because traditional Native American
beliefs regarding the land, the stones that compose it, and the fossils
embedded in it, suggest a special Native American interest in, and
competence for, safeguarding paleontological resources against those
who regard such resources solely in commercial terms.28 9 Finally, the
history of encounters between Native Americans and paleontologists
in the nineteenth century and the story of BHIGR's conduct in the
Black Hills case reveal that paleontologists often take high-handed atti-
tudes toward tribes and disregard tribal sovereignty whenever possi-
ble." ° These problems could be addressed by recognizing a tribal
role in the regulation of paleontological resources on reservation
lands.
Part IV analyzes three possible legal foundations for tribal author-
ity to regulate the extraction of paleontological resources from all res-
ervation land: tribal sovereignty, treaty rights, and recognition of
regulatory authority through federal legislation. Although tribes may
use other forms of regulation-such as a general license requirement
for doing business on the reservation 1 -to impose some control
over conduct related to paleontological resources on reservation
lands, Part IV's focus is on regulations, such as excavation permit re-
289. The expansion of the commercial fossil market in recent years poses a serious
threat to paleontological resources. One commentator has described the threat as follows:
[Miore than fifty commercial fossil companies and countless individual prospec-
tors comprise a multimillion dollar industry .... Many in the professional com-
munity view the commercialization of fossil collecting as posing a direct threat to
public and scientific access to paleontological specimens. They argue that com-
mercialization will result in sale to private entities, illegal excavation from public
lands, and increased vandalism of fossil sites.
Lazerwitz, supra note 11, at 602 (footnotes omitted).
290. Archaeologists have demonstrated similar attitudes toward Native American rights
and tribal interests. See, e.g., James Riding In, Without Ethics and Morality: A Historical Over-
view of Imperial Archaeology and American Indians, 24 ARiz. ST. L.J. 11 (1992). Moreover,
some paleontologists gathered human remains in addition to fossils. See, e.g., supra notes
266-267 and accompanying text (discussing Cope's collection of Sioux skulls).
291. A Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe ordinance, for example, provides that "'[i]t shall be
unlawful for any person, to engage in, pursue or transact any businees [sic] on the Chey-
enne River Indian Reservation without first having obtained a license therefor.... .'" Duffy
& Lofgren, supra note 9, at 507 n.245 (quoting Tribal Ordinance No. 1). Another tribal
ordinance provides for the forfeiture of property that is used in a manner that violates any
other tribal ordinance. Id. at 507 n.246 (quoting Tribal Ordinance No. 52a). The Chey-
enne River Sioux Tribe invoked this ordinance in seeking forfeiture of the fossil taken by
BHIGR because BHIGR had not obtained the required license. Id. at 507. The tribal court
held that the tribe could not rely on the forfeiture ordinance in its tribal court suit against
BHIGR because it was adopted after removal of the fossil. Tribe Loses Round in Fight Over
Dinosaur Named Sue, supra note 13, at 23A. The basic framework developed in Part IV of




quirements,292 aimed specifically at paleontological resources. The
Article will examine each of these three possible foundations for regu-
latory authority in turn.
A. Tribal Sovereignty as a Basis for Tribal Regulation of
Paleontological Resources
In 1832, in Worcester v. Georgia,293 Chief Justice John Marshall
characterized Indian tribes as "distinct political communities, having
territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and
having a right to all lands within those boundaries, which is not only
acknowledged, but guarantied by the United States."" 4 This view of
tribal authority and control over land within the tribe's territory ap-
pears to provide a strong basis for tribal regulatory authority over pale-
ontological resources found within reservation boundaries. In the
years since Worcester, however, Congress and the Supreme Court have
undercut the tribal governmental authority and control over reserva-
tion land envisioned by Chief Justice Marshall.
1. The Dawes Act and Its Legacy.-In 1887 Congress enacted the
General Allotment Act, also known as the Dawes Act,295 which pro-
vided for the allotment of tribal land to individual tribal members,
and the opening up of "surplus" reservation land to non-Indian settle-
ment.296 The allotment policy had disastrous effects on the tribes and
292. Under the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, for example,
tribal consent-which could take the form of a permit requirement-is required for exca-
vations on reservation lands. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(c) (Supp. V 1993); see also infra notes 429-
441 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of NAGPRA).
293. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
294. Id. at 557. In Worcester, the Supreme Court invalidated a Georgia statute purporting
to extend state jurisdiction over Cherokee territory in Georgia, finding that the statute
violated Cherokee sovereignty and conflicted with the Constitution, acts of Congress, and
federal treaties. Id. at 561-62. For a discussion of Chief Justice Marshall's view of tribal
sovereignty as developed in Worcester and in a preceding case, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), see Dussias I, supra note 288, at 6-17.
295. Ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339,
341, 342, 348, 349, 354, 381 (1988)).
296. COHEN, supra note 67, at 130-31. Although Indian lands had been allotted as early
as 1633 and many treaties reserved specific tracts of land for individual Indians or Indian
families, the Dawes Act provided for the first comprehensive allotment program. Id. at
129-30. The Dawes Act authorized the President to divide tribal lands into allotments for
individual tribal members. 25 U.S.C. § 331. Title to the allotments was to be held in trust
for the allottees by the United States for 25 years or longer at the President's discretion,
after which a patent was to be issued to the allottee. Id. §§ 348-349. Any "surplus" lands
remaining after allotment could be sold to the United States for eventual sale to settlers,
with the proceeds of the sale held in trust for the tribes whose land was sold. Id. § 348. For
a more thorough discussion of the Dawes Act and its aftermath, see COHEN, supra note 67,
at 130-43.
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the allottees, and was repudiated in the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934.97 Although the IRA prohibited further allotment of Indian
lands, 98 the damage to the Indian land base had already been done.
Indian landholdings had decreased from 138 million acres in 1887 to
48 million acres in 1934.99 The Dawes Act did not terminate the res-
ervations, and consequently the allotted lands, including those con-
veyed to non-Indians, remained part of the reservations on which they
were located.3 00 As a result, the reservations survived the Dawes Act,
while tribal control over land, as described by ChiefJustice Marshall in
Worcester v. Georgia,3 11 did not. After allotment and its aftermath,
many tribes no longer had "a right to all lands within [their territo-
rial] boundaries." 30 2 Rather, on many reservations, non-Indian-owned
land had become interspersed with Indian land, often in a "checker-
board" pattern,30 3 a phenomenon that has had significant repercus-
sions for tribal sovereignty in general, and for tribal regulatory
authority in particular.0 4
2. Judicial Curtailment of Tribal Sovereignty-Based Regulatory Author-
ity.-While Congress undercut tribal control over reservation land
through the allotment policy and its aftermath, the Supreme Court
similarly has curtailed tribal regulatory authority, at times in explicit
reliance on the alienation of reservation land resulting from the
297. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1988). For a more detailed discussion of the IRA, see Co-
HEN, supra note 67, at 147-51. See also supra note 42 and accompanying text.
298. 25 U.S.C. § 461. In addition, existing trust periods and alienation restrictions were
extended indefinitely. Id. § 462.
299. COHEN, supra note 67, at 138. Of the 90 million acres of Indian land that were lost,
about 27 million acres passed from Indian allottees by sale; the remaining acres were
ceded outright or sold to non-Indians as "surplus" lands. Id.
300. The Supreme Court made this principle of continued reservation status explicit in
cases such as Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984), in which it stated,
[O]nly Congress can divest a reservation of its land and diminish its boundaries.
Once a block of land is set aside for an Indian reservation and no matter what
happens to the titie of individual plots within the area, the entire block retains its
reservation status until Congress explicitly indicates otherwise.
Id. at 470.
301. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832).
302. Id.
303. The Port Madison Reservation in Washington, for example, "is a checkerboard of
tribal community land, allotted Indian lands, property held in fee simple by non-Indians,
and various roads and public highways maintained by Kitsap County." Oliphant v. Su-
quamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 193 (1978). At the time of the Oliphant decision,
approximately 63% of the land on the Port Madison Reservation was owned in fee simple
absolute by non-Indians. Id. at 193 n.1; see also COHEN, supra note 67, at 509 (noting that
this "checkerboard ownership pattern" interfered with tribal culture and society).
304. See, e.g., infra notes 321-342 and accompanying text (discussing Brendale v. Confed-
erated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 445 (1989)).
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Dawes Act.3 ° 5 This curtailment is one aspect of the Court's recent
efforts to limit tribal sovereignty to authority over tribal members, as
opposed to authority over the geographic area of the tribe's
reservation.° 6
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of tribal regulatory
authority in three recent cases.3 0 7 Although these cases have recog-
nized tribal regulatory authority over tribal land, 0 8 they also have es-
tablished an uncertain framework for examining tribal regulatory
authority over nonmembers of the tribe on nonmember land within
reservation boundaries. This framework must be examined to analyze
the extent of tribal authority to regulate, as part of inherent tribal
sovereignty, the excavation and removal of paleontological resources
from reservation lands.
In 1981 in Montana v. United States,"° 9 the Court considered
whether the Crow Tribe had authority on the basis of its inherent sov-
ereignty to regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers of the tribe
on land owned by nonmembers within the boundaries of the Crow
Reservation." l0 The Court held that although the tribe could prohibit
305. See infra notes 336-341 and accompanying text (discussingJustice Stevens's opinion
in Brendale).
306. For an analysis of the Supreme Court's recent treatment of geographically and
membership-based views of tribal sovereignty and the implications of the Court's increas-
ing focus on a membership-based view of sovereignty, see Dussias I, supra note 288, at 17-
96.
307. South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309 (1993); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes
and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989); Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544 (1981).
308. See, e.g., Montana, 450 U.S. at 557 (recognizing tribal authority to prohibit or regu-
late hunting and fishing by nonmembers on tribal or trust land); see also Brendale, 492 U.S.
at 445 (Stevens, J., announcing the judgment in part and concurring in part) (noting that
the Tribe "of course retains authority to regulate the use of trust land"); COHEN, supra note
67, at 465 ("In the exercise of its regulatory authority, a tribe can require a nonmember to
purchase a license and to abide by game management rules for the reservation's Indian
lands.").
309. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). For an analysis of Montana, see Dussias I, supra note 288, at
58-62. See also COHEN, supra note 67, at 256-57 (discussing Montana); Frank Pommersheim,
Tribal-State Relations: Hope for the Future?, 36 S.D. L. REv. 239, 255-56 (1991) [hereinafter
Pommersheim II] (same); Judith V. Royster, Mineral Development in Indian Country: The
Evolution of Tribal Control Over Mineral Resources, 29 TULSA L.J. 541, 604-05 & nn.404-12
(1994) (discussing Montana and the theory of implied divestiture, under which tribes are
presumed to have lost regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians on non-Indian fee land
within Indian country); Craighton Goeppele, Note, Solutions for Uneasy Neighbors: Regulat-
ing the Reservation Environment After Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima
Indian Nation, 109 S. Ct. 2994 (1989), 65 WASH. L. REv. 417, 419-20 (1990) (discussing the
Montana Court's approach to defining the limits of tribal authority).
310. Montana, 450 U.S. at 547. As grounds for its regulatory authority, the tribe relied
(1) on its purported ownership of the bed of the Big Horn River, which ran through the
reservation, (2) on rights under treaties, and (3) on its inherent sovereignty. Id. The
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or regulate nonmember hunting and fishing on land owned by or
held in trust for the tribe,311 its inherent sovereignty did not extend to
the regulation of nonmember hunting and fishing on nonmember
land.31 2 The Court stated a "general proposition that the inherent
sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of
nonmembers of the tribe."31 3 Reasoning that the "dependent status"
of the tribes implicitly had divested them of attributes of sovereignty
that involve the relations between the tribe and nonmembers, 1 14 the
Court stated that the "exercise of tribal power beyond what is neces-
sary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is
inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot
survive without express congressional delegation."315
The Court, however, was willing to recognize that tribes retain
some power over nonmembers, even on nonmember lands, and identi-
fied two basic circumstances under which such power is retained:
A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other
means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual
Court rejected the tribe's claim with respect to the riverbed, holding that title to the
riverbed passed to Montana when it became a state. Id. at 556-57; see also infra notes 381-
389 and accompanying text (discussing the tribe's treaty-based claim).
311. Montane; 450 U.S. at 557. The Court described tribal regulatory authority regard-
ing hunting and fishing on tribal land as follows:
The Court of Appeals held that the Tribe may prohibit nonmembers from hunt-
ing or fishing on land belonging to the Tribe or held by the United States in trust
for the Tribe... and with this holding we can readily agree. We also agree with
the Court of Appeals that if the Tribe permits nonmembers to fish or hunt on
such lands, it may condition their entry by charging a fee or establishing bag and
creel limits.
Id.; see also id. at 566-67 ("[T]he District Court found that Montana's statutory and regula-
tory scheme does not prevent the Crow Tribe from limiting or forbidding non-Indian
hunting and fishing on lands still owned by or held in trust for the Tribe or its members.").
312. Id. at 564-65.
313. Id. at 565.
314. Id. at 563-64. The Court used "dependent status" as a basis for curtailing tribal
sovereignty in 1978 in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978), a
criminal jurisdiction case. See Dussias I, supra note 288, at 28-29 (discussing "dependent
status"). Oliphant has been the subject of much scholarly criticism. See, e.g., Russel L. Barsh
& James Y. Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting
of the Snark, 63 MiNN. L. REV. 609 (1979); see also Kevin Meisner, Comment, Modern Problems
of CriminalJurisdiction in Indian Country, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 175, 187-96 (1992) (ques-
tioning the Oliphant Court's interpretation of treaties, case law, and statutes). In addition
to losing authority under the dependent status doctrine, tribes also may lose governmental
powers by ceding powers in treaties or by congressional divestiture. United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
315. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564. Justice Blackmun later criticized this statement as being
"contrary to 150 years of Indian-law jurisprudence and.., not supported by the cases on




relationships with the tribe or its members, through com-
mercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements....
A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil au-
thority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within
its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some di-
rect effect on the political integrity, the economic security,
or the health or welfare of the tribe. 16
These circumstances, therefore, were exceptions to the Court's "gen-
eral proposition" that inherent tribal sovereignty does not extend to
nonmember activities. 17 The Court found neither of these excep-
tions applicable in Montana."l '
Montana thus recognized tribal authority to regulate nonmem-
bers on tribal land. 1 9 Furthermore, despite its general proposition
limiting tribal authority over nonmembers, the Court found two ex-
ceptions, based on retained tribal sovereignty, that extend tribal au-
thority over nonmembers on nonmember land. First, the Court
recognized the "consensual relationship" exception, when nonmem-
bers have entered into consensual relationships with the tribe or its
members. Second, it recognized the "direct effect" exception, when
the conduct on nonmember land threatens or has a direct effect on
the tribe. 20
In 1989, in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima
Indian Nation,121 the Court again focused on tribal regulatory author-
316. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66 (citations omitted).
317. Id. at 565.
318. Id. at 566. The Court noted that non-Indian hunters and fishermen on non-Indian
land did not enter into any agreements or dealings with the tribe, the first exception men-
tioned by the Court in which regulatory jurisdiction would be present. Id. Moreover, the
tribe's complaint had not alleged that non-Indian hunting and fishing on non-Indian lands
imperiled the tribe's subsistence or welfare, and thus "nothing in this case suggests that
such non-Indian hunting and fishing so threaten the Tribe's political or economic security
as to justify tribal regulation." Id. Of course, the tribe could not have known the impor-
tance of such an allegation prior to the Court's opinion in Montana
319. See supra note 311 and accompanying text. The Court has reiterated this principle
in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 147 (1982)
(stating that the presence and conduct of non-Indians on Indian lands "are conditioned by
the limitations the tribe may choose to impose."); see also Brendale v. Confederated Tribes
and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 445 (1989) (recognizing tribal au-
thority to regulate the use of trust land).
320. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
321. 492 U.S. 408 (1989). For a detailed discussion of Brendale and its significance, see
Joseph W. Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L REv. 1 (1991). See also Robert N.
Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law,
46 AxK. L. REv. 77, 149 (1993) (discussing Brendale); Dussias I, supra note 288, at 62-69
(same); Pommersheim II, supra note 309, at 256-58 (same); Royster, supra note 309, at 605-
06 (same).
130 [VOL. 55:84
SCIENCE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE SACRED TEXT
ity over nonmember land, analyzing whether the Yakima Indian Na-
tion had authority to impose zoning regulations on land owned by
nonmembers on the Yakima Reservation in Washington.s2 The
Yakima Reservation bore the scars of the repudiated federal allotment
policy.3 2 3 Eighty percent of reservation land was held in trust for the
tribe or individual tribal members, while the remaining twenty per-
cent consisted of fee land that was concentrated in one part of the
reservation, the so-called open area.3 24 The western two-thirds of the
reservation was deemed the "closed area," and consisted predomi-
nantly of trust land.325
The Court's attempt to deal with the issue presented in Brendale
resulted in three opinions and two pluralities that established that the
tribe had authority to impose its zoning regulations on nonmember
land in the closed area,32 6 but not on nonmember land in the open
area.3 27 A majority focused on Montana28 as providing the basic ap-
proach for analyzing tribal zoning authority over nonmember land,
although the Justices disagreed on how to interpret and apply that
case.
Justice White, in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, argued that under the general prin-
ciple stated in Montana, the tribe had no authority, based on inherent
sovereignty, to impose zoning regulations on nonmember land in
either the closed or the open area.32 9 Justice White sought to limit
tribal authority under the direct effect exception to Montana's "gen-
eral principle" on the ground that the exception was prefaced by the
word "may." 30 Justice White argued that the use of "may" indicated
that tribal authority "need not extend" to all nonmember conduct on
322. 492 U.S. at 414.
323. See supra notes 295-302 and accompanying text (describing the policy and its
repudiation).
324. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 415.
325. Id.
326. Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall upheld tribal zon-
ing authority over nonmember land in the closed area. See infra notes 334-335, 336-341
and accompanying text (discussing the opinions of Justices Blackmun and Stevens,
respectively).
327. Justice White, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Stevens, and
O'Connor struck down tribal zoning authority over nonmember land in the open area. See
infra notes 329-333, 336-341 and accompanying text (discussing the opinions of Justices
White and Stevens, respectively).
328. See supra notes 309-320 and accompanying text (discussing Montana).
329. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 428 (White, J., announcing the judgment in part and dissent-
ing in part).
330. Id. at 428-29; see also supra notes 313-317 and accompanying text (discussing the
general principle of Montana and its two exceptions).
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nonmember land that threatens or has a direct effect on the tribe. 31
Rather, the impact "must be demonstrably serious and must imperil the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health and welfare of
the tribe.3 32 Similarly, the Court found inapplicable the consensual
relationship exception.
3 3 3
Justice Blackmun, in an opinion joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, took a broader view of the tribal regulatory authority envi-
sioned by Montana. He objected toJustice White's characterization of
Montana as "establishing a general rule, modified only by two narrow
exceptions, that Indian tribes have no authority over the activities of
non-Indians on their reservations absent express congressional dele-
gation."33 4 Rather, Justice Blackmun maintained, Montana should be
read to recognize inherent tribal authority over nonmember activities
wherever those activities "implicate a significant tribal interest."
3 3 5
In the third Brendale opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
O'Connor, announced the judgment of the Court with respect to tri-
bal authority over the closed area. 36 Justice Stevens focused on the
extent to which the tribe had lost the power to exclude nonmembers
from the open and closed areas of the reservation 37-a power that
331. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 429.
332. Id. at 431 (emphasis added). Justice White's opinion, which announced the judg-
ment of the Court with respect to the open area, concluded that the tribe could not im-
pose zoning regulations on nonmember land in the open area. Id. at 432. Justice White
maintained that neither of the exceptions noted in Montana provided a basis for tribal
zoning regulation of nonmember land in the open area. Id. As to the closed area, Justice
White believed that the case should be remanded to the district court. Id. at 432-33.
333. There was no consensual relationship between the nonmember landowners and
the tribe. Id. at 428. Apparently no consensual relationship existed between the nonmem-
bers and individual tribal members either, because the parties had agreed that the consen-
sual relationship exception did not apply. Id. Presumably, had such a relationship existed,
the tribe would have argued that it provided a basis for regulatory authority.
334. Id. at 449 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Blackmun concluded that the tribe could impose zoning regulations on non-
member land in both the closed and open areas, reasoning that "[tihis fundamental sover-
eign power of local governments to control land use is especially vital to Indians, who enjoy
a unique historical and cultural connection to the land." Id. at 448-49, 458. In his view,
"[i]t would be difficult to conceive of a power more central to 'the economic security, or
the health or welfare of the tribe' than the power to zone." Id. at 458 (citation omitted)
(quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981)); see also Dussias I, supra note
288, at 66 (discussing Justice Blackmun's opinion).
335. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 450 (Blackman, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part); see also id. at 456-57 (contending that Montana should be read "to rec-
oguize that tribes may regulate the on-reservation conduct of non-Indians whenever a sig-
nificant tribal interest is threatened or directly affected.").
336. Id. at 433 (Stevens, J., announcing the judgment in part and concurring in part).
337. Id. ("[T]he proper resolution of these cases depends on the extent to which the
Tribe's virtually absolute power to exclude has been either diminished by federal statute or
voluntarily surrendered by the Tribe itself."). Justice Stevens concluded that the tribe
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"necessarily must include the lesser power to regulate land use in the
interest of protecting the tribal community."3 ' In Justice Stevens's
view, tribal regulatory authority based on tribal sovereignty was dimin-
ished by the allotment and alienation of reservation land resulting
from the Dawes Act," 9 even though the Dawes Act did not itself trans-
fer regulatory power from the tribe to state or local governments., °
Justice Stevens distinguished Montana, rather than relying on its analy-
sis to recognize or reject tribal regulatory authority.341
Brendale revealed considerable division within the Court, not only
over the extent of tribal regulatory authority, but also over the role the
Montana framework should play in resolving this issue. Moreover,
Brendale demonstrated how nonmember land ownership resulting
from the allotment policy could be used to justify curtailing tribal reg-
ulatory authority, despite the fact that nonmember lands remain a
part of the reservation on which they are located.3
42
The Court made its most recent statement on tribal regulatory
authority in 1993, in South Dakota v. Bourland.43 In Bourland, the
Court considered whether the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe-the same
tribe whose interests were largely ignored in the Black Hills case 3 1-
could regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on reservation
lands that had been taken by the United States, mostly from the tribe,
could impose zoning regulations on nonmember land in the closed area but not in the
open area because the tribe, as a result of the allotment policy, no longer had the power to
exclude nonmembers from a large portion of the open area, and therefore had lost the
power to define the "essential character" of the area. Id. at 444-47.
338. Id. at 433.
339. Id. at 436-37.
340. Id. at 436.
341. Id. at 443. He noted that in Montana the conduct of non-Indians on non-Indian
lands "posed no threat to the welfare of the Tribe." Id. In Brendae, on the other hand, the
planned nonmember conduct in the closed area jeopardized critical assets of the area and
threatened the area's cultural and spiritual values, thus having negative effects on the gen-
eral health and welfare of the tribe and its members. Id.
342. See supra note 300 and accompanying text (discussing Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S.
463 (1984)). Justice Blackmun noted in his Brendale opinion that distinguishing between
the open and closed areas of the reservation was inconsistent with earlier cases establishing
that allotment did not diminish the reservation status of land owned by nonmembers.
Brendale, 492 U.S. at 463 (Blackmun,J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part); see also Dussias I, supra note 288, at 72-74 (discussing the Court's rejection of a
geographical approach to determine tribal regulatory authority).
343. 113 S. Ct. 2309 (1993). For further discussion of Bourland, see Dussias I, supra note
288, at 69-72. Joseph W. Singer, Remembering What Hurts Us Most: A Critique of the AMERICAN
INDIAN LAw DsKooK, 24 N.M. L. REV. 315, 325 (1994); Soifer, supra note 191, at 544-51;
Chad W. Swenson, Note, South Dakota v. Bourland: Drouming Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal
Sovereignty in a Flood of Broken Promises, 39 S.D. L. REv. 181 passim (1994).
344. The Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation was the site of the discovery of the Tyranno-
saurus rex that was at stake in the Black Hills case. See supra text accompanying notes 5-7.
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for a dam and reservoir project.3 45 Congress had provided that the
taken lands would be open to the general public for recreational
uses.34 The taken lands were therefore treated as an "open area" in
the Brendale terminology.3 47
The Court relied on the "general proposition," articulated in
Montana, that inherent tribal sovereignty did not extend to the activi-
ties of nonmembers of the tribe."s The Court remanded the case,
however, for a determination of whether either of the two Montana
exceptions applied with respect to the taken area. 49
The opinions in Montana, Brendale, and Bourland paint a confus-
ing picture of sovereignty-based tribal regulatory authority over non-
members on nonmember land. They acknowledge that tribes retain
regulatory authority over the conduct of nonmembers on land be-
longing to the tribe.35 ° These decisions also establish that, as a gen-
eral rule, tribes cannot exercise regulatory authority over
345. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2313. The taken land consisted of 104,420 acres of trust land
acquired from the tribe and 18,000 acres of land acquired from non-Indians. Id. at 2313-
14.
346. Id. at 2317.
347. Id. at 2316 n.9. The district court found that the taken lands did not constitute a
"closed" area. Id. The Court agreed that the taken area had been broadly opened to the
public and it therefore did not need to discuss tribal regulatory authority in a closed area.
Id.; see also supra notes 324-325 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between
open and closed areas of a reservation in Brendale).
348. Bourlan4 113 S. Ct. at 2320. In a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Souter
joined, Justice Blackmun criticized the majority's reliance on Montana and Brendale. Id. at
2323 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He also repeated the criticism that he had voiced in
Brendale of a narrow reading of Montana Id. at 2322 n.2; see also supra note 334 and accom-
panying text (discussing Justice Blackmun's criticism of Justice White's interpretation in
Brendale of the Montana case).
349. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2320; see also supra notes 316-317 and accompanying text
(discussing the Montana exceptions). The district court had concluded that neither of the
exceptions applied to any of the taken lands. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2320. The Eighth
Circuit had instructed the district court to reexamine its analysis as to the land taken from
non-Indians, but did not address the district court's previous findings regarding the taken
lands as a whole. Id. On remand, the court of appeals concluded that the consensual
relationship exception was not relevant, and that the district court's finding that the direct
effect exception was not applicable was not clearly erroneous. South Dakota v. Bourland,
39 F.3d 868, 869-70 (8th Cir. 1994). One member of the three-judge panel, Senior Circuit
Judge Heaney, dissented, agreeing with the position of the United States as amicus curiae:
[T] he district court improperly interpreted the second Montana exception to re-
quire an extremely strong showing that tribal regulation of non-Indian conduct
on the taken lands.., is necessary to protect tribal welfare. The proper approach
must include an analysis of whether non-Indian conduct on the taken lands has a
"direct effect" on the Tribe's political or economic health or welfare.
Id. at 871 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
350. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1981). This authority should extend
to both land belonging to the tribe as an entity, and land belonging to individual tribal
members. See Dussias I, supra note 288, at 61 n.259.
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nonmembers on nonmember land as part of their inherent sover-
eignty.351 Nevertheless, tribes retain regulatory authority over the
conduct of nonmembers on nonmember land when nonmembers
have entered into a consensual relationship with the tribe or its mem-
bers, or when nonmembers' conduct threatens or has a direct effect
on the tribe.35 The cases leave unclear the scope of tribal regulatory
authority based on the consensual relationship exception. Nor do
they resolve the questions of how serious a threat the conduct of non-
members must pose to the tribe, or how substantial the effect on a
tribe must be, for the tribe to have authority under the direct effect
exception. Moreover, variations in relative concentrations of tribal
and nonmember land from one part of the reservation to another can
make determinations of tribal sovereignty-based regulatory authority
still more difficult.
Given this uncertain picture, retained tribal sovereignty does not
appear to be a secure foundation for a tribal claim of regulatory au-
thority over paleontological resources on all land within the bounda-
ries of a reservation. Montana, Brendale, and Bourland would allow for
tribal regulation of nonmembers with respect to paleontological re-
sources on land owned by, or held in trust for, the tribe. 53 Moreover,
tribal regulatory authority also should extend to nonmember conduct
on land owned in fee by individual tribal members"M or, as in the
Black Hills case, land held in trust by the United States for individual
tribal members.355 Thus in the Black Hills situation, if tribal regula-
351. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565 ("[T]he inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do
not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe."); Brenda, 492 U.S. 408, 428
(1989) (WhiteJ, announcing thejudgment in part and dissenting in part) ("[U]nder the
general principle enunciated in Montana, the Yakima Nation has no authority to impose its
zoning ordinance on the fee lands owned by [the nonmember landowners]."); Bourland,
113 S. Ct. 2309, 2320 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565).
352. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564; see also Brendale, 492 U.S. at 428 (White, J., announcing
the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566); Bourland,
113 S. Ct. at 2320 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566).
353. See supra note 311 and accompanying text (discussing Montana's approach to tribal
regulatory authority regarding hunting and fishing on tribal land).
354. These cases did not question tribal authority over Indian lands, which include land
owned in fee by tribal members. Inherent sovereign power to regulate Indian lands sur-
vived Montana because it is not subject to the limitations on tribal regulatory authority that
Montana imposed. See also Royster, supra note 309, at 603 (noting that "tribes have inher-
ent, and virtually plenary, sovereign power to regulate Indian conduct and Indian lands
within reservation boundaries."). Land held by tribal members in fee still may be subject
to restrictions on alienation. COHEN, supra note 67, at 615-16. Such land is thus similar to
trust land. Id. A parcel of land owned by an Indian subject to an alienation restriction is
referred to as a "restricted fee" allotment. Id. at 616.
355. This question was not specifically decided by Montana, but the Montana Court
noted, with apparent approval, the district court's finding that "Montana's statutory and
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tions relating specifically to paleontological resources had existed,
they should have been applicable to the nonmember conduct on
Maurice Williams's ranch. 56 Similarly, although Montana, Brendale,
and Bourland did not directly address tribal regulatory authority over
members, these cases did make clear that tribes retain considerable
power over their members by virtue of tribal sovereignty. In Montana,
for example, the Court noted that "in addition to the power to punish
tribal offenders, the Indian tribes retain their inherent power to deter-
mine tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations among mem-
bers, and to prescribe rules of inheritance for members." 57 Tribal
regulatory authority over members is not curtailed by Montana's gen-
eral principle that "the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe
do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe." 58
Rather, such authority over members involves "'the powers of self-gov-
ernment"' and "'relations among members of a tribe,"' which have
not been lost by virtue of the tribes' "'dependent status.' 359 In other
cases, the Court has recognized explicitly that tribes retain full author-
ity over tribal members,36 ° which should include regulatory authority
over the conduct of members with respect to paleontological re-
sources wherever located on the reservation.
The foregoing analysis indicates that nonmember conduct on
nonmember land presents the most significant challenge to invoking
inherent tribal sovereignty as a basis for tribal regulatory authority
over paleontological resources on all reservation lands. To regulate
such conduct, a tribe presumably would have to establish that its in-
regulatory scheme does not prevent the Crow Tribe from limiting or forbidding non-In-
dian hunting and fishing on lands still owned by or held in trust for the Tribe or its mem-
bers." Montana, 450 U.S. at 566-67 (emphasis added). Although this sentence focuses on
Montana's regulation, it assumes that tribal regulatory authority exists with respect to non-
members on tribal and member land. See also United States ex rel. Morongo Band of Mis-
sion Indians v. Rose, 34 F.3d 901, 906 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that although tribal
authority to impose a bingo ordinance against non-Indians on Indians' trust allotments
remains an "open question," the Supreme Court has upheld tribal taxation of transactions
that take place on tribal trust lands).
356. See supra note 291 (discussing the tribe's business license ordinance).
357. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564. The Court also described its holding in United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), in which it noted that Indian tribes are "unique aggrega-
tions possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory" and
upheld tribal criminal jurisdiction over tribal members. Id. at 563 (quoting Wheeler, 435
U.S. at 323).
358. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
359. Id. at 564 (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326); see also COHEN, supra note 67, at 464
(discussing tribal authority over reservation hunting and fishing by members); id. at 246
(discussing tribal authority, pursuant to treaty, over off-reservation fishing by members).
360. See, e.g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 332 (1983) ("A
tribe's power to prescribe the conduct of tribal members has never been doubted .... ").
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herent sovereignty allows such regulation under one of the Montana
exceptions. The precise scope of these exceptions is, however,
unclear.
Because the Court has not reexamined the consensual relation-
ship exception in any case since Montana, the exception's actual scope
and application are uncertain.361 One question that remains unan-
swered is whether-in the event that a consensual relationship exists
between a nonmember and a tribe or tribal member-it provides a
basis for general tribal regulatory authority over the nonmember's ac-
tivities, or only for authority over activities related to the
relationship.362
In some circumstances, the consensual relationship exception
may support retained regulatory power over nonmember conduct
with respect to paleontological resources on nonmember land. In the
Black Hills case, for example, there were commercial dealings-and
thus a consensual relationship-between a nonmember (BHIGR) and
a tribal member (Maurice Williams).63 Under the language of the
consensual relationship exception, such dealings should have sus-
tained tribal regulatory authority over BHIGR's conduct, even if non-
member land had been involved. Tribes should be able to exercise
regulatory authority over paleontological resources on this basis in
other instances where there is a consensual relationship between a
nonmember and the tribe or a tribal member. Unless the Supreme
Court provides further guidance on the exact application and scope
of the consensual relationship exception, however, tribes will be un-
361. Timothy R Malone & Bradley B. Furber, Regulatory Jurisdiction Over Nonmembers'
Land Within Indian Reservations, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Spring 1993, at 14, 15. Several
lower federal court decisions have, however, upheld tribal regulation of nonmembers on
nonmember land under the consensual relationship exception. See, e.g., FMC v. Shoshone-
Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311, 1314-15 (9th Cir. 1990) (tribal employment ordinance),
cert. denied, 499 U.S. 943 (1991); Cardin v. De La Cruz, 671 F.2d 363, 366 (9th Cir. 1982)
(building, health, and safety codes), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982); see also United States
ex reL Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 34 F.3d 901, 906-07 (9th Cir. 1994) (bingo
ordinance held applicable to nonmember on allotted trust land under consensual relation-
ship exception).
362. The actual language of the exception does not suggest this limitation, but, given
the Court's recent efforts to curtail tribal sovereignty, it is not difficult to imagine the
Court imposing such a limitation. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 564; see also Malone & Furber,
supra note 361, at 15 (discussing a possible minimum contacts analysis). In FMC v. Sho-
shone-Bannock Tribes, the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's claim that "a direct linkage
must exist between the regulation and the particular activity regulated," but also suggested
that "at some point the commercial relationship becomes so attenuated or stale that Mon-
tana's consensual relationship requirement would not be met." 905 F.2d at 1314-15.




able to rely on the existence of a consensual agreement to guarantee
that courts will uphold their exercise of regulatory authority.
Similar uncertainty clouds tribal use of the direct effect excep-
tion, which allows tribes to exercise retained tribal authority when
nonmember conduct on nonmember land poses a threat to, or di-
rectly affects, the tribe. This exception was discussed but not precisely
defined in both Montana and Brendale.64 Although the Court has pro-
vided more analysis of the direct effect exception than it has of the
consensual relationship exception, the Justices have disagreed over its
precise nature. In Montana, the Court focused only on whether non-
member hunting and fishing threatened the tribe, rather than also
looking at whether there was at least some direct effect on the tribe. 6
The language of the direct effect exception indicates that conduct
that either threatens or has a direct effect on the tribe can provide the
basis for retained regulatory authority." In Brendale, the Justices
presented competing views of the direct effect exception. Justice
White required a "demonstrably serious" adverse effect, 67 while Jus-
tice Blackmun required only that a "significant tribal interest" be im-
plicated. 68 Bourland did not provide clarification. 69
The direct effect exception refers to "the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe." T3 ° A tribe
seeking to rely on this exception to establish retained regulatory au-
thority over nonmembers on nonmember land might argue that the
tribe's political integrity, as a sovereign entity with authority over the
geographic area of the reservation, would be threatened or directly
affected if the tribe were unable to regulate the excavation and re-
moval of paleontological resources. This argument would have partic-
ular weight in light of the significance of the land and fossils for
Native Americans and the history of the plunder of fossils from reser-
vation lands. The tribe also might contend that its economic security
would be threatened or directly affected if it could not regulate, per-
haps through a paid permit process, the excavation of these valuable
364. See supra notes 316-318, 330-332 and accompanying text.
365. See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
366. See supra note 316 and accompanying text (quoting the language of the Montana
exceptions).
367. See supra note 332 and accompanying text.
368. See supra note 335 and accompanying text; see also Royster, supra note 309, at 605-06
(discussing Brendale).
369. The Bourland Court quoted the language of the two Montana exceptions, but re-
manded for consideration of whether either of the exceptions was present. South Dakota
v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309, 2320 (1993). For a description of the result on remand, see
supra note 349.
370. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).
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resources from reservation lands. Finally, the tribe might argue that
the practice of traditional religions, which is integrally related to the
health and welfare of the tribe and its members, would be threatened
or directly affected if the tribe could not regulate paleontological re-
sources on all reservation lands. Nevertheless, because of the Court's
conflicting messages regarding the precise meaning and scope of the
direct effect exception, it is difficult to assess confidently the excep-
tion's application to the regulation of paleontological resources. A
number of lower court decisions have upheld tribal regulatory author-
ity over nonmembers on nonmember land under the direct effect ex-
371buthrception, but there is no guarantee that the Supreme Court would
follow these decisions. Given the Court's increasing reluctance to rec-
ognize the exercise of tribal sovereignty over nonmembers, as well as
the changes in the Court's membership since Justice Blackmun ar-
gued for a broad view of the direct effect exception in Brendale ,3 72 it is
doubtful that the Court will take a broad view of the direct effect ex-
ception when it next examines the issue. Thus, as with the consensual
relationship exception, it may be difficult for tribes to rely on the di-
rect effect exception as the basis for retained tribal regulatory author-
ity over paleontological resources on all reservation land.
Finally, Brendale's distinction between closed and open areas on
reservations deepens the uncertainty over application of the Montana
exceptions to tribal regulation of paleontological resources on non-
member land. The Court has not yet reexamined this distinction
fully. Nor has it provided further guidance as to what proportion of
nonmember ownership in an area indicates that it should be treated
371. See, e.g., Babbitt Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Indian Tribe, 710 F.2d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 1983)
(automobile repossession), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 926 (1984); Cardin v. De La Cruz, 671 F.2d
363, 366 (9th Cir. 1982) (building, health, and safety codes), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967
(1982); Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951, 964 (9th Cir.
1982) (riparian rights), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 977 (1982); Knight v. Shoshone and Arapahoe
Indian Tribes, 670 F.2d 900, 903 (10th Cir. 1982) (zoning); see also Royster, supra note 309,
at 605 n.413 (listing lower court decisions).
372. Since Brendak was decided, Justice Blackmun, as well as Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall, who joined Justice Blackmun in his opinion in Brendale, have left the Court. Justice
Blackmun retired in 1994. See Douglas Jehl, The Supreme Court: The Overview; Mitchell Viewed
as Top Candidate for High CourA N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1994, at Al. For an analysis of his
contributions to the development of Indian law, see Allison M. Dussias, Heeding the Demands
ofJustice: Justice Blackmun's Indian Law Opinions, 71 N.D. L. REv. 41 (1995). Justice Bren-
nan retired from the Court during the summer of 1990. Linda Greenhouse, Vacancy on the
Court; Brennan, Key Libera4 Quits Supreme Court, N.Y. TiMES, July 21, 1990, at Al. Justice
Marshall retired from the Court during the summer of 1991. Andrew Rosenthal, Marshall
Retires from High Cour4 N.Y. TiMES, June 28, 1991, at Al.
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as an open or closed area."' Bourland did not clarify the distinction.
The Bourland Court noted that the district court had found that the
area taken for the dam project was not a closed area, and agreed that
the area had been "broadly opened to the public," without further
elaboration on the open/closed distinction.374 Thus, in analyzing
possible regulatory authority over paleontological resources on non-
member land, tribes whose reservations have substantial nonmember
land ownership concentrated in part of the reservation face additional
uncertainty as to whether these land ownership patterns may affect
their regulatory authority over nonmembers on nonmember lands.
Uncertainty with respect to the open/closed distinction and the
scope and application of the Montana exceptions may make it difficult
for tribes to conclude with complete confidence that they can exercise
regulatory authority over paleontological resources on all reservation
land on the basis of retained tribal sovereignty. Thus tribal sover-
eignty in the 1990s may not provide much more protection against
the taking of paleontological resources from reservation lands than it
did in the nineteenth century.
B. Treaty Rights as a Basis for Tribal Regulation of
Paleontological Resources
Treaties between tribes and the United States are another poten-
tial source of tribal regulatory authority over nonmembers on the res-
ervation. The United States and its predecessors 75 entered into
treaties with the tribes as they would with foreign nations. Treaties
frequently recognized the tribes' separate sovereignty.376 Many trea-
ties dealt with issues of criminal jurisdiction over Indian lands,377 but
373. In Brendae, Justice Stevens admitted the difficulties presented by lack of a bright-
line rule. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408, 447 (1989) (Stevens, J., announcing the judgment in part and concurring in
part).
374. South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 n.9 (1993); see also supra notes 346-
347 and accompanying text (discussing Bourland); Singer, supra note 343, at 325 (discuss-
ing Bourland's limited precedential value).
375. For a description of treaty making between Indian tribes and European nations
before the American Revolution, see COHEN, supra note 67, at 50-58. For a description of
treaty making between the United States and Indian tribes before the adoption of the
Constitution, see id. at 58-62. The Constitution recognizes Indian treaties entered into
before its adoption. See U.S. CONS-r. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that "all Treaties made.., under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . .. ."). For a
description of treaty making after the adoption of the Constitution, see COHEN, supra note
67, at 62-107.
376. COHEN, supra note 67, at 65.
377. Id. at 67.
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most did not deal expressly with issues of general civil jurisdiction, 78
let alone regulatory authority. Although formal treaty making with
the tribes was ended by statute in 1871, the statute provided that obli-
gations under existing treaties were not to be impaired.3 79 Treaties
therefore continue to play an important role in Indian law, and con-
tinue to be an important source of tribal rights.
In Montana, Brendale, and Bourland, the Court considered the
treaties between the federal government and the relevant tribes, along
with retained tribal sovereignty, as a possible basis for regulatory au-
thority over nonmembers. In each of these cases, however, the Court
concluded that the relevant treaties did not support tribal regulatory
authority over nonmembers on nonmember lands.
In Montana v. United States, the Court interpreted the First Treaty
of Fort Laramie of 1851,38' in which the signatory tribes, including the
Crow Tribe, acknowledged designated areas as their respective territo-
ries. 81 Although the treaty specified that the signatory tribes did not
"'surrender the privilege of hunting, fishing or passing over"' any of
the lands described in the treaty, 8 ' the Montana Court concluded
that the treaty "nowhere suggested that Congress intended to grant
authority to the Crow Tribe to regulate hunting and fishing by non-
members on nonmember lands."383 The Court also examined the
Second Treaty of Fort Laramie of 1868, which established a reserva-
tion for the Crow Tribe that was to be "set apart for the absolute and
undisturbed use and occupation" of the Crow Tribe, and provided
that no non-Indians except authorized federal agents "shall ever be
permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in" the reservation.384
378. Id. at 68. A few treaties, however, contained assurances that state laws would not be
applied to Indians. Id.
379. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§ 71 (1988)).
380. The First Treaty of Fort Laramie of 1851, Sept. 17, 1851, 11 Stat. 749.
381. 450 U.S. 544, 547-48 (1981). The treaty identified approximately 38.5 million
acres of land as Crow territory. Id. at 548. For a description of the circumstances sur-
rounding the signing of the 1851 treaty, which was designed to secure the safe passage of
white travelers to the West, see LAzARus, supra note 78, at 16-20; UTLEY, supra note 200, at
61. In addition to the Crow Tribe, the Sioux, Cheyenne, Arapaho, Assinboine, Gros Ven-
tre, Mandan, and Arikara Tribes also signed the 1851 treaty. COHEN, supra note 67, at 96.
382. Montana, 450 U.S. at 548 (quoting the Treaty of Fort Laramie of 1851, Art. V, 11
Stat. 749).
383. Id. at 558. The Court further noted that the complaint had not indicated that non-
Indian hunting and fishing on the reservation had impaired this privilege. Id. at 558 n.6.
384. Id. at 548 (quoting the Second Treaty of Fort Laramie of 1868, May 7, 1868, Art. II,
15 Stat. 649). The 1868 treaty reduced the territory set aside for the tribe under the 1851
treaty to a reservation of roughly eight million acres. Id.; see also COHEN, supra note 67, at
104 (discussing the 1868 treaty). The United States also signed treaties with the Sioux, the
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Because this treaty obligated the United States to prohibit most non-
Indians from residing on or passing through reservation lands, it "ar-
guably conferred upon the Tribe the authority to control fishing and
hunting on those lands.""8 5 The Court concluded, however, that this
authority could only extend to lands on which the tribe has "absolute
and undisturbed use and occupation."3 8 6 The amount of such land
had been reduced substantially by allotment and alienation."8 7 Treaty
rights with respect to reservation lands, the Court stated, "must be
read in light of the subsequent alienation of those lands."388 The
Court concluded that any tribal power created by the 1868 treaty to
regulate or prohibit non-Indian hunting and fishing did not apply to
non-Indian lands.38 9 Thus the tribe could not base regulatory author-
ity over nonmembers on nonmember lands on the rights guaranteed
to it by the United States in treaties.
In Brendale, the Court interpreted an 1855 treaty between the
Yakima Tribe and the United States.3 90 The treaty provided that the
tribe retained the land constituting its reservation for its "exclusive use
and benefit" 91 and that no "white man, excepting those in the em-
ployment of the Indian Department, [shall] be permitted to reside
upon the said reservation without permission of the tribe and the su-
perintendent and agent. "392 Justice White relied on the analysis of
treaty rights in Montana3 93 to reject the tribe's argument that the
power to exclude guaranteed by the treaty gave the tribe regulatory
Northern Cheyenne, and the Northern Arapaho Tribes in 1868. Id. at 104 n.354; see also
infra text accompanying notes 399-400 (describing the Sioux treaty).
385. Montana, 450 U.S. at 558-59.
386. Id. at 559.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 561.
389. Id.
390. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408 (1989). The treaty between the United States and the Yakima Nation of Indians, 12
Stat. 951, was signed in 1855 and ratified by the Senate in 1859. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 414
(White, J., announcing the judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also COHEN, supra
note 67, at 102 n.330 (noting the 1855 treaty).
391. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 415 (White, J., announcing the judgment in part and dissent-
ing in part) (quoting 12 Stat. 951, 952).
392. Id. at 415 n.1 (quoting 12 Stat. 951, 952). The treaty also involved the cession of
millions of acres of land to the United States and the retention of approximately 1.3 mil-
lion acres of land by the tribe. Id. at 435 (Stevens,J, announcing the judgment in part and
concurring in part).
393. Id. at 425 (White,J, announcing the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("We
would follow Montana and conclude that, for the reasons stated there, any regulatory
power the Tribe might have had under the treaty 'cannot apply to lands held in fee by non-
Indians.'" (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 559)).
[VOL. 55:84
SCIENCE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE SACRED TEXT
authority over nonmember land. 94 Like the Montana Court, Justice
White viewed the tribe's treaty rights as having been diminished by
the allotment and alienation of reservation land, despite the fact that
the allotment policy later was repudiated. 95 Justice Stevens also
found that when the allotment and alienation of reservation land had
reduced the tribe's power to exclude nonmembers from a portion of
the reservation, the tribe's regulatory authority, which ran parallel to
the power to exclude that had been confirmed by treaty,3 96 also had
been diminished.3 97 Thus in Brendale, as in Montana, a majority of the
Court3 98 interpreted treaty-based rights to exclude, and therefore also
to regulate, nonmembers as having been curtailed as a result of allot-
ment and alienation.
Finally, in Bourland, the Court interpreted provisions of the 1868
Fort Laramie Treaty between the United States and the Sioux, a treaty
that was parallel to the Crow Tribe's 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty that
394. Id. at 422-25. The crucial factor forJustice White was the subsequent alienation of
lands guaranteed to the Yakimas by the treaty. "'[Tireaty rights with respect to reservation
lands must be read in light of the subsequent alienation of those lands.'" Id. at 422 (quot-
ing Montana, 450 U.S. at 561); see also supra notes 381-389 and accompanying text (describ-
ing the Montana analysis).
395. Id. at 423; see also supra notes 297-299 and accompanying text (describing the repu-
diation of the allotment policy in the Indian Reorganization Act). Justice White noted,
"the Court in Montana was well aware of the change in Indian policy engendered by the
Indian Reorganization Act and concluded that this fact was irrelevant." Brendale, 492 U.S.
at 423 (White, J., announcing the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citing Mon-
tana, 450 U.S. at 560 n.9).
396. Brendake 492 U.S. at 435 (StevensJ, announcing the judgment in part and concur-
ring in part). In Justice Stevens's view, the 1855 treaty confirmed the tribe's "sovereign
power of exclusion" that existed even without a treaty. Id. at 435. After the treaty, "the
Tribe's power to exclude was firmly established. The power to regulate land use ran paral-
lel to the power to exclude. Just as the Tribe had authority to limit absolutely access to the
reservation, so it could also limit access to persons whose activities would conform to the
Tribe's general plan for land use." Id. at 435-36; see also supra notes 337-341 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Justice Stevens's views of inherent tribal sovereignty as a possible
basis for regulatory authority).
397. Brendal, 492 U.S. at 436 (StevensJ, announcing the judgment in part and concur-
ring in part). Applying this approach, Justice Stevens concluded that "[b]y maintaining
the power to exclude nonmembers from entering all but a small portion of the closed
area," the tribe had not surrendered "its historic right to regulate land use" in that portion
of the reservation, and therefore could zone nonmember land in the closed area. Id. at
441, 444. On the other hand, because the tribe no longer had the power to exclude non-
members from a large portion of the open area, it had no authority to regulate nonmem-
ber land use in that area. Id. at 44445.
398. Unlike the majority, Justice Blackmun focused on inherent sovereignty as the basis




was interpreted in Montana.99 The treaty provided that the Great
Sioux Reservation was to be held for the "absolute and undisturbed
use and occupation" of the tribal signatories, and that no non-Indians
(other than government agents) would "ever be permitted to pass
over, settle upon, or reside in" the reservation."° A subsequent fed-
eral statute removed a substantial amount of land from the reserva-
tion and divided the remaining land into several reservations,
including the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation." 1 In addition, a se-
ries of federal statutes provided for the taking of reservation lands for
a dam and reservoir project.40 2 The Court concluded that although
under the 1868 treaty the tribe had possessed the authority to exclude
non-Indians from the taken lands, and arguably to regulate non-In-
dian use of those lands," 3 the federal statutes had eliminated both
powers. 4 The Court relied on Montana and Brendale as establishing
that the loss of tribal lands to non-Indians, at least in an "open area"
of the reservation, implied the loss of any treaty-based regulatory juris-
diction over the use of the lands."°
399. South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309, 2313 (1993); see also supra note 384 and
accompanying text (discussing the treaty language in Montana); supra note 241 (quoting
treaty provisions).
400. Bourland, 113 S. CL at 2313 (quoting the Fort Laramie Treaty, 15 Stat. 635). For a
description of the circumstances surrounding the negotiation and signing of the treaty, see
LAzARus, supra note 78, at 45-53. The treaty is reprinted in LAzARus, supra note 78, at 433-
49 app. A.
401. Bourland 113 S. Ct. at 2313 (citing the Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 405, 25 Star. 888).
The 1889 Act also authorized allotment of reservation lands. Id. Some of these allotted
parcels, as well as other parcels that were declared "surplus" pursuant to the General Allot-
ment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, and the Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 218, 35 Stat. 460,
ultimately were acquired by non-Indians. Bourland 113 S. Ct. at 2313. As a result of these
actions, trust lands constituted less than half of the reservation at the time that Bourland
was decided. Id.
402. Bourland, 113 S. Ct at 2313-14 (discussing the Flood Control Act of 1944, ch. 665,
58 Stat. 887, and the Cheyenne River Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 1191). The Cheyenne River Act,
68 Stat. 1191, reserved for the tribe and its members certain rights with respect to the use
of the lands taken from the tribe, including hunting and fishing rights. Bourkand, 113 S.
Ct. at 2314 (citing 68 Stat. at 1193).
403. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2316.
404. Id. at 2316-17.
405. Id. at 2316. The Court observed:
Montana and Brenda/e establish that when an Indian tribe conveys ownership of its
tribal lands to non-Indians, it loses any former right of absolute and exclusive use
and occupation of the conveyed lands. The abrogation of this greater right, at
least in the context of the type of area at issue in this case, implies the loss of
regulatory jurisdiction over use of the land by others.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Souter, dissented. justice Blackmun distinguished
Montana and Brendale in which the land at issue had been conveyed to non-Indians pursu-
ant to the Dawes Act, from the situation in Bourland, where the land at issue had been
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Given the Court's holdings in these three cases, it may be difficult
for a tribe to rely with confidence on treaty language as a basis for
tribal regulatory authority over nonmembers with respect to paleonto-
logical resources on nonmember lands. Although the precise provi-
sions vary from one treaty to another, these cases demonstrate that
even treaty language that provides sweeping guarantees of undis-
turbed use of reservation lands has not been treated as granting regu-
latory authority over nonmembers on nonmember lands because the
treaty language has been read "in light of' the subsequent alienation
of reservation lands to non-Indians pursuant to federal statutes such
as the Dawes Act. Moreover, although the Court has readily inter-
preted treaty provisions "in light of' the Dawes Act, it has been unwill-
ing to evaluate the Dawes Act and its aftermath "in light of' the
subsequent repudiation of the allotment policy.
4 °6
Two additional aspects of the Court's approach in these cases also
demonstrate its reluctance to view treaty rights as ensuring regulatory
authority over nonmembers on nonmember land. First, the Court did
not rely on the basic canons of construction that it has developed for
interpreting Indian treaties. According to these canons, treaties
"should be construed as the Indians would have understood them, ....
ambiguous expressions must be resolved in favor of the Indians....
and . .. treaties [must] be liberally construed in favor of the Indi-
ans."" 7 The Court overlooked all of these canons in favor of a focus
taken by the federal government for the limited purpose of building a dam. Id. at 2323
(Blackmun,J., dissenting). Use of the taken land for a dam and for incidental recreational
purposes was "perfectly consistent with continued tribal authority to regulate hunting and
fishing by non-Indians .... Even if the Tribe lacks the power to exclude, it may sanction
with fines and other civil penalties those who violate its regulations." Id. In order for
treaty rights to be abrogated, Justice Blackmun argued, there must be "'clear evidence that
Congress actually considered the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and
Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the
treaty.'" Id. at 2322 (quoting United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740 (1986)). The major-
ity, he said, "points not even to a scrap of evidence that Congress actually considered the
possibility that by taking the land in question it would deprive the Tribe of its authority to
regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on that land." Id.
406. In Montana, for example, the Court noted in a footnote that
[t] he policy of allotment and sale of surplus land was, of course, repudiated in
1934 by the Indian Reorganization Act .... But what is relevant in this case is the
effect of the land alienation occasioned by that policy on Indian treaty rights tied
to Indian use and occupation of reservation land.
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 559 n.9 (1981) (citation omitted).
407. COHEN, supra note 67, at 63 n.10 (citations omitted). The Court referred to the
liberal construction and ambiguity canons in Bourland, but did not apply them. Bourland,
113 S. Ct. at 2316. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun cited the canon on deferring to Indian
understanding. Id. at 2323 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He found it "implausible that the
Tribe here would have thought every right subsumed in the Fort Laramie Treaty's sweep-
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on the alienation of land to nonmembers occasioned by federal stat-
utes. The Court might well take the same approach if it is required to
construe a treaty as a possible basis for regulatory authority over pale-
ontological resources on nonmember land.
Second, in these cases the Court failed to require the clear ex-
pression of congressional intent to abrogate Indian treaty rights that
had been required in previous cases.408 In Montana, the Court relied
instead on its notion of "common sense" in determining congres-
sional intent: "It defies common sense to suppose that Congress
would intend that non-Indians purchasing allotted lands would be-
come subject to tribal jurisdiction.... ."' Although the Court noted
in Bourland that "we usually insist that Congress clearly express its intent"
to abrogate Indians' treaty rights, 410 it was willing to infer intent to
abrogate from federal statutes that did not address tribal regulatory
authority over nonmembers.4 1 1
In short, the Court's approach in Montana, Brendale, and Bourland
to reviewing treaties as possible guarantees of regulatory authority
over nonmembers on nonmember land has demonstrated that trea-
ties, as interpreted by the Court, are a questionable basis for assertions
of broad tribal regulatory authority. The Court itself, by reading
treaty language in light of the alienation of reservation land to non-
members, in effect has abrogated much of the regulatory authority
ing language to be defeated the moment they lost the right to exclusive use of their land."
Id.
408. COHEN, supra note 67, at 63 ("[T]he courts will not find that Indian treaties have
been abrogated by later treaties or legislation unless there is a clear and specific showing in
the later enactment that abrogation was intended."); see also GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL IN-
DIAN LAW CASES AND MATERiALs 348 (3d ed. 1993) ("The 'clear statement' test is now al-
most always accepted as the starting point for analysis."). See generally Charles F. Wilkinson
& John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows or
Grass Grows Upon the Earth"--How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CAL. L. REv. 601 (1975).
409. Montana, 450 U.S. at 560 n.9. Justice White's opinion in Brendale also used the
Montana "common sense" formulation. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 423 (1989) (White, J., announcing the judgment in
part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens engaged in similar speculation regarding con-
gressional intent:
Although it is inconceivable that Congress would have intended that the sale of a
few lots would divest the Tribe of the power to determine the character of the
tribal community, it is equally improbable that Congress envisioned that the
Tribe would retain its interest in regulating the use of vast ranges of land sold in
fee to nonmembers who lack any voice in setting tribal policy.
Id. at 437 (Stevens, J., announcing the judgment in part and concurring in part).
410. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2316 (emphasis added).
411. Id. Justice Blackmun noted in his dissent that the majority found "Congress' intent
implicit in the fact that Congress deprived the Tribe of its right to exclusive use of the land
.. . [.1 [TIhe majority adopts precisely the sort of reasoning-by-implication" that was re-
jected by earlier cases. Id. at 2322 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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over nonmembers on nonmember land that may have been guaran-
teed implicitly to tribes by treaty provisions.
C. Federal Legislation as the Basis for Tribal Regulation of
Paleontological Resources
Tribal regulatory authority over tribal members and over lands
owned by, or held in trust for, the tribe or its members generally is
accepted as an element of retained tribal sovereignty.412 Tribal regu-
latory authority over nonmembers on nonmember land is, however,
more problematic. The discussion above has demonstrated the uncer-
tainties involved in relying on retained tribal sovereignty"' and treaty
provisions41 4 as foundations for assertions of tribal regulatory author-
ity over nonmembers on nonmember land, with respect to paleonto-
logical resources or other matters. This part of the Article will discuss
federal legislation as a means of recognizing tribal regulatory author-
ity over paleontological resources on all reservation lands.
1. Tribal Regulation of Archaeological Resources. -Although there is
no existing federal legislation providing for a tribal role in the regula-
tion of paleontological resources on reservation land, two federal stat-
utes-the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979415 and the
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990416-
already provide explicitly for a tribal role in the regulation of archaeo-
logical resources. ARPA and NAGPRA provide useful models for con-
sidering the possibility of federal legislation to recognize a tribal role
in the regulation of paleontological resources on reservation lands.
ARPA was enacted in recognition of the fact that archaeological
resources on public and Indian lands-an "irreplaceable part" of the
heritage of the United States-are "increasingly endangered because
of their commercial attractiveness" and are threatened by "uncon-
trolled excavations and pillage."417 "Archaeological resource" is de-
fined by ARPA to include "any material remains of past human life or
activities which are of archaeological interest. "418 Paleontological
412. See supra notes 353-360 and accompanying text.
413. See supra notes 361-374 and accompanying text.
414. See supra notes 406-411 and accompanying text.
415. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
416. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (Supp. V 1993).
417. 16 U.S.C. § 470aa(a)(1)-(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
418. Id. § 470bb(1) (1988). Only items that are at least 100 years old are to be treated as
archaeological resources. Id. In addition, the Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture, and
Defense and the Chairman of the Board of the Tennessee Valley Authority were directed
to promulgate regulations after consultation with Indian tribes and others. Id. § 470ii(a)
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specimens, whether fossilized419 or unfossilized,4 2° are not to be con-
sidered archaeological resources unless they are found in an "archaeo-
logical context. "421 ARPA established a permitting process for the
excavation and removal of archaeological resources from "public
lands or Indian lands."422 "Indian lands" are defined as "lands of In-
dian tribes, or Indian individuals, that are either held in trust by the
United States or subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by
the United States." 423 ARPA prohibits excavating, removing, or dam-
aging archaeological resources on public lands or Indian lands with-
out a permit issued under ARPA or the Antiquities Act of 1906.424 In
(1988). The regulations were to be promulgated only after consideration of the American
Indian Religious Freedom Act. 42 U.S.C. 1996 (1988 & Supp. 1993); 16 U.S.C. § 470ii(a).
The regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior are published in 25 C.F.R. pt.
262 (1995) and 43 C.F.R. pt. 7 (1994).
419. A dead organism becomes fossilized "when the spaces once filled by its organic
matter are replaced by mineral substances. It literally turns to stone." GAYRARD-VALY, supra
note 114, at 156. In order for an organism to become fossilized, certain conditions must
exist:
The dead organism must be quickly buried in the sand, mud, or ooze so that it
will not disintegrate.... Secondly, there must be no (or very little) decomposi-
tion; instead, there must be gradual replacement of organic matter by mineral
substances. Thirdly, for a fossil to survive whole for millions of years, it cannot be
subjected to folding, heat buildup in the earth's interior, or other potentially de-
structive disturbances.
Id.
420. In rare cases, organisms are preserved in an unfossilized state. Woolly mammoths
and rhinoceroses, for example, have been found frozen solid in the Siberian permafrost.
Id.
421. 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(1) (1988). The ARPA regulations state further that paleontolog-
ical resources "shall not be considered of archaeological interest, and shall not be consid-
ered to be archaeological resources for the purposes of the Act and this part, unless found
in a direct physical relationship with archaeological resources as defined in this section."
43 C.F.R. § 7.3(a) (4) (1994).
422. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(a) (1988). Although ARPA's permit requirements apply only to
public lands and Indian lands, as defined in the Act, its trafficking provisions are not so
limited:
No person may sell, purchase, exchange, transport, receive, or offer to sell,
purchase or exchange, in interstate or foreign commerce, any archaeological re-
source excavated, removed, sold, purchased, exchanged, transported, or received
in violation of any provision, rule, regulation, ordinance, or permit in effect
under State or local law.
Id. § 470ee(c).
423. Id. § 470bb(4). "Public lands" include lands that are part of the national park sys-
tem. Id. § 470bb(3). ARPA makes it clear that only public lands and Indian lands are to be
affected by its provisions. Id. § 470kk(c) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to
affect any land other than public land or Indian land or to affect the lawful recovery,
collection, or sale of archaeological resources from land other than public land or Indian
land.").
424. Id. § 470ee(a). It also prohibits trafficking in archaeological resources that were
excavated or removed in violation of ARPA. Id. § 470ee(b). For a discussion of the Antiq-
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order for the federal land manager with permitting authority425 to is-
sue a permit for excavation or removal of archaeological resources
located on "Indian lands," "the Indian or Indian tribe owning or hav-
ing jurisdiction over such lands" must consent.42 6 No permit is re-
quired for excavation and removal by tribes or tribal members of
archaeological resources on the tribe's Indian lands.4 2 7 In addition, if
a permit issued under ARPA "may result in harm to, or destruction of,
any religious or cultural site," the federal land manager must, before
issuing a permit, "notify any Indian tribe which may consider the site
as having religious or cultural importance." 42 8 Indian consent is not
uities Act of 1906, see supra notes 30, 286. See also Kristine 0. Rogers, Visigoths Revisited:
The Prosecution of Archaeological Resource Thieves, Traffickers, and Vandals, 2 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 47, 52-68 (1987). For criticism of the Antiquities Act, see Jack F. Trope & Walter R.
Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act: Background and Legis-
lative History, 24 ARIz. ST. LJ. 35, 42 (1992).
425. Federal land manager is defined in terms of the government department or agency
that has primary management authority over the lands in question. 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(2)
(1988). The Secretary of the Interior is the federal land manager for Indian lands. 43
C.F.R. § 7.3(c) (1994).
426. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(g)(2) (1988). The permit "shall include such terms and condi-
tions as may be requested by such Indian or Indian tribe." Id. The regulations elaborate
further on the consent required for Indian lands:
When Indian tribal lands are involved. . . the consent of the Indian tribal govern-
ment must be obtained. For Indian allotted lands outside reservation boundaries,
consent from only the individual landowner is needed. When multiple-owner al-
lotted lands are involved, consent by more than 50 percent of the ownership in-
terest is sufficient. For Indian allotted lands within reservation boundaries,
consent must be obtained from the Indian tribal government and the individual
landowner(s).
43 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1994); see also 25 C.F.R. § 262.5(c) (1994). "Allotted lands" are de-
fined as "lands granted to Indian individuals by the United States and held in trust for
those individuals by the United States." 43 C.F.R. § 7.32(b) (1994). The regulations make
it clear that archaeological resources that are excavated or removed from Indian lands
.remain the property of the Indian or Indian tribe having rights of ownership over such
resources." 43 C.F.R. § 7.13(b) (1994); see also 25 C.F.R. § 262.8 (1994) (providing coordi-
nation with NAGPRA). The regulations also contemplate the possibility of tribal permit
requirements by providing that "[t]he issuance of a permit ... does not remove the re-
quirement for any other permit required by Indian tribal law." 43 C.F.R. § 7.35(d) (1994).
427. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(g)(1) (1988). If, however, there is no tribal law "regulating the
excavation or removal of archaeological resources on Indian lands, an individual tribal
member shall be required to obtain a permit" under ARPA. Id. This section clearly con-
templates tribal regulation of tribal members' activities with respect to paleontological
resources.
428. Id. § 470cc(c). This provision is not restricted to Indian lands and therefore also
applies to public lands. The statute itself does not, however, provide any relief to the noti-
fied tribe with respect to such a site. The regulations define a "site of religious or cultural
importance" as follows:
a location which has traditionally been considered important by an Indian tribe
because of a religious event which happened there; because it contains specific
natural products which are of religious or cultural importance; because it is be-
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required for excavation or removal of archaeological resources on
public lands or on nonmember lands within reservation boundaries,
even if the site from which the resources are to be removed has reli-
gious or cultural importance for a tribe. However, by requiring notifi-
cation to tribes as to sites with religious or cultural importance, ARPA
at least gives tribes an opportunity to raise any concerns they may have
about activities at these sites.
NAGPRA, enacted in 1990, was the culmination of a decades-long
struggle by Native Americans to obtain protection against grave dese-
cration and to recover the remains of dead ancestors and objects of
cultural and religious significance.429 Aptly described by Senator
Daniel Inouye as human rights legislation, designed to protect "the
civil rights of America's first citizens,"4"' NAGPRA reflects the trust
responsibility of the United States to Native Americans4 ' and "the
unique relationship between the Federal Government and Indian
tribes."4" 2 The Act provides for the repatriation of Native American
human remains and certain other protected objects4"3 from the hold-
ings of federal agencies and federally funded state and local institu-
tions434 under specified circumstances.435
lieved to be the dwelling place of, the embodiment of, or a place conducive to
communication with spiritual beings; because it contains elements of life-cycle
rituals, such as burials and associated materials; or because it has other specific
and continuing significance in Indian religion or culture.
43 C.F.R1 § 7.32(a) (1994).
429. Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 424, at 36. For a description of the history of the
acquisition of human remains and sacred objects from Native Americans and their lands,
see id. at 38-45. See also id. at 54-58 (describing the background to the passage of NAG-
PRA). The provisions of NAGPRA are discussed in id. at 61-76. For a number of additional
articles on NAGPRA, see Symposium, The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation
Act of 1990 and State Repatriation-Related Legislation, 24 Aiuz. ST. LJ. 1 (1992).
430. 136 CONG. Rac. S17,174 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Inouye).
431. For a description of the trust responsibility, see COHEN, supra note 67, at 220-28.
The trust responsibility requires the United States "to adhere strictly to fiduciary standards
in its dealings with Indians." Id. at 207.
432. 25 U.S.C. § 3010.
433. NAGPRA applies to "cultural items," defined to include human remains, funerary
objects ("objects that, as a part of the death rite or ceremony of a culture, are reasonably
believed to have been placed with individual human remains either at the time of death or
later"), "sacred objects" ("specific ceremonial objects which are needed by traditional Na-
tive American religious leaders for the practice of traditional Native American religions by
their present day adherents"), and "cultural patrimony" (objects "having ongoing histori-
cal, traditional, or cultural importance central to the Native American group or culture
itself ... and which, therefore, cannot be alienated, appropriated, or conveyed by any
individual"). 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3). Funerary objects are divided into associated and unas-
sociated funerary objects, based on whether the associated human remains are in the pos-
session of an institution covered by the Act. Id. § 3001(3) (A)-(B).
434. NAGPRA applies to federal agencies, defined as "any department, agency, or in-
strumentality of the United States," excluding the Smithsonian Institution, and to "muse-
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In addition to repatriation, NAGPRA provides protection for Na-
tive American cultural items excavated or discovered on federal or
tribal lands after its enactment. It also defines "tribal lands" to in-
clude "all lands within the exterior boundaries of any Indian reserva-
tion."436 NAGPRA thus covers objects on nonmember land on
reservations, in contrast to ARPA.437 Native American cultural items
can be removed from or excavated on federal or tribal lands only after
a permit has been obtained pursuant to ARPA, and the appropriate
tribe has been consulted or, in the case of tribal lands, has con-
sented. 3 ' If Native American cultural items are discovered inadver-
tently on federal or tribal lands, the appropriate federal official (in
the case of federal lands) or tribe (in the case of tribal lands) must be
notified, and, if the discovery occurred in connection with construc-
tion or another activity, the discoverer must also "cease the activity in
urns," defined as "any institution or State or local government agency ... that receives
Federal funds and has possession of, or control over, Native American cultural items." 25
U.S.C. § 3001(4), (8).
435. The repatriation obligation is set out in 25 U.S.C. § 3005. The following is a help-
ful summary of the repatriation requirement for human remains and associated funerary
objects:
NAGPRA requires federal agencies ... and museums ... to return human re-
mains and associated funerary objects upon request of a lineal descendant, In-
dian tribe, or Native Hawaiian organization where the museum or agency itself
identifies the cultural affiliation of the items through the ... inventory process
[required by NAGPRA]. In addition, if a museum or agency inventory does not
establish the affiliation of the human remains or associated funerary objects, the
Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization may still obtain the return of the
remains or objects if it can prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it has
a cultural affiliation with the item.
Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 424, at 61-62 (footnotes omitted). NAGPRA also provides
for repatriation of unassociated funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural
patrimony. 25 U.S.C. § 3005(a) (2), (4), (5). There is, however, an additional requirement
for the repatriation of these types of objects, which involves presenting evidence related to
the agency or museum's "right of possession." Id. § 3005(c). "Right of possession" is de-
fined in id. § 3001(13). See also Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 424, at 65-68 (describing
the process for repatriation of such objects).
436. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(15). Dependent Indian communities and certain lands adminis-
tered for the benefit of Native Hawaiians also are included within the definition. Id. For
an explanation of the term "dependent Indian community," see COHEN, supra note 67, at
33, 38-39.
437. See supra notes 422-423 and accompanying text.
438. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(c). The regulations promulgated by the Department of the Inte-
rior pursuant to NAGPRA, 25 C.F.R. pt. 262 (1995), set out the procedure for obtaining
permits for excavation or removal of archaeological resources on Indian lands, which in-
clude lands of individual Indians and of tribes that are held in trust by the United States or
are subject to alienation or encumbrance restrictions. 25 C.F.R. § 262.2 (1995).
1996]
MARYLAND LAW REvIEw
the area of the discovery, [and] make a reasonable effort to protect
the items discovered before resuming such activity." "'
NAGPRA provides for Native American ownership or control of
Native American cultural items that are excavated or removed from
federal or tribal lands after the date of the statute.' 4 Depending on
the circumstances, an individual Native American or a tribe may own
or control a cultural item."' NAGPRA thus reflects considerable re-
spect for the significance of human remains and cultural and religious
objects to Native Americans, and for the tribal right to a role in con-
trolling the excavation and removal of these items from reservation
lands.
2. Ensuring a Tribal Role in the Regulation of Paleontological Re-
sources on Reservation Lands.-ARPA and NAGPRA were enacted for
two basic reasons. First, Congress recognized that certain objects, as
well as human remains, had religious and cultural significance for Na-
tive Americans,442 and that the federal government was obligated, as
part of its trust responsibility, to respect this significance by protecting
tribal rights with respect to those objects and human remains." 3 Con-
gress also recognized that certain sites have religious or cultural signif-
icance for tribes and provided for at least some protection for tribal
interests in those sites.4' Second, the history of the desecration of
Native American graves and the plundering of Native American
archaeological resources and objects of cultural and religious signifi-
439. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(d). Following the required notification to, and certification of
receipt of the notification by, the appropriate federal official or tribe, "the activity may
resume after 30 days of such certification." Id.
440. 25 U.S.C. § 3002.
441. Id. § 3002(a). NAGPRA provides a list of priorities for determining whether an
individual or a tribe shall own or control cultural items "excavated or discovered on Fed-
eral or tribal lands after November 16, 1990." Id. In the case of human remains and
associated funerary objects, the lineal descendants of the deceased have priority. Id.
§ 3002(a) (1). In cases in which lineal descendants cannot be ascertained, and in the case
of unassociated funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural patrimony, NAG-
PRA provides for tribal ownership. Id. § 3002 (a) (2). If the items are found on tribal lands,
the tribe on whose lands the items were discovered will own or control their disposition.
Id. § 3002(a)(2)(A). If the items are found on federal lands, the tribe that has the closest
cultural affiliation with them will own or control them. Id. § 3002 (a) (2) (B). If the cultural
affiliation of the items cannot reasonably be ascertained, but the items were discovered on
land that has been recognized by a final judgment of the Indian Claims Commission or
Court of Claims as a particular tribe's aboriginal land, that tribe has ownership or control
unless another tribe establishes a stronger cultural relationship. Id. § 3002(a) (2) (C).
442. See supra notes 417-441 and accompanying text (discussing ARPA and NAGPRA).
443. See supra notes 431-432 and accompanying text (discussing the trust responsibility).
444. See supra note 428 and accompanying text (describing the ARPA notification
requirement).
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cance demonstrated the need to protect Native American remains
and other objects." 5 Given this history, Congress perceived the need
for protecting human remains and artifacts that had not yet been ex-
cavated," 6 as well as the need to address Native American rights with
respect to human remains and objects that already have been re-
moved from reservation lands." 7
Neither ARPA nor NAGPRA, however, was designed to protect
tribal interests in controlling and regulating paleontological resources
on reservation lands. ARPA contains language that was designed to
exclude paleontological resources from the Act's coverage unless they
are found in an archaeological context."' NAGPRA does not specifi-
cally exclude paleontological resources from coverage, and it is con-
ceivable that a particular fossil might fit the definition of a "sacred
object" or an object of "cultural patrimony" under NAGPRA," 9 and
thus be protected. Similarly, if a particular fossil were placed with
human remains,15 it could also be protected under NAGPRA. NAG-
PRA was not intended, however, to provide comprehensive protection
for tribal interests in paleontological resources on reservation lands.
The concerns that led to the passage of ARPA and NAGPRA, however,
justify consideration of federal legislation to ensure a tribal role in the
regulation of paleontological resources on reservation lands.
a. Protecting the Sacred Text-As discussed in Part II, tradi-
tional Native American thought assigns a sacred significance to the
land4 1 and to the elements that compose it.45 Moreover, prehistoric
animals and their fossil remains play a role in the myths and tradi-
tional healing practices of a number of tribes.453 This suggests that
Native American interests in paleontological resources are similar to
their interests in human remains, archaeological artifacts, and other
cultural items, as recognized in ARPA and NAGPRA. Thus, the sepa-
rate treatment of archaeological resources and paleontological re-
sources, often advocated by paleontologists concerned about
445. See supra note 429 and accompanying text.
446. See supra notes 417-428, 436-441 and accompanying text (describing the ARPA and
NAGPRA permit requirements).
447. See supra notes 433-435 (discussing NAGPRA's repatriation provisions).
448. See supra note 421 and accompanying text.
449. See supra note 433 (defining "sacred objects" and "cultural patrimony" under
NAGPRA).
450. See supra note 433 (defining "funerary objects" under NAGPRA).
451. See supra part II.A (describing the sacred significance of the land).
452. See supra part II.B (describing the sacred significance of stones).
453. See supra part II.C (describing the sacred significance of fossils).
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regulation, 45 4 and reflected in ARPA,455 does not make sense and de-
serves reexamination. At the very least, the religious and cultural sig-
nificance of land and fossils in traditional Native American thought
suggests that tribal interests in regulating the extraction and removal
of paleontological resources from reservation lands deserve further
examination. Of course, only tribal leaders can determine and ex-
plain fully the significance of these resources for their tribes and the
form of tribal regulation that they deem appropriate. In the Black
Hills case, for example, officials of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe
described the fossil taken by BHIGR as being part of their cultural
heritage.456 Moreover, the trust obligation of the federal government
toward Native American people and tribes, which was recognized with
NAGPRA's enactment,457 also supports federal legislation to protect
expressed tribal interests in paleontological resources on reservation
lands. At the very least, this trust relationship indicates the appropri-
ateness of federal inquiry into the nature and extent of tribal interests
in this area and into whether such interests are being protected
adequately.458
It should also be emphasized that these traditional beliefs in the
sacred nature of the land, stones, and fossils are not simply of histori-
cal interest. Despite extensive efforts by the federal government to
destroy traditional Native American religious beliefs and practices as
454. Paleontologists, particularly those who are concerned about federal regulation,
often emphasize the difference between paleontology and archaeology in their writings.
See, e.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 286, at 11 ("Attempts have been made by various federal
agencies to regulate the collecting of fossils under statutes, or derived regulations, in-
tended for archeological objects. This development is attributable to the misconception
that paleontology is closely allied to archeology in its methods, objects of study, and
goals."). Other paleontologists, however, are willing to admit the overlap between paleon-
tology and archaeology in general. See, e.g., FORTEY, supra note 172, at 9 ("The province of
the paleontologist overlaps with that of the archaeologist .... [I]n the sites where the
remains of early man are discovered it is quite possible to find the paleontologist and the
archaeologist working side by side.").
455. See supra note 421 and accompanying text (describing ARPA's exclusion of paleon-
tological resources).
456. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
457. See supra notes 431-432 and accompanying text (describing the trust relationship as
the basis for NAGPRA).
458. The cultural and religious significance of paleontological resources also supports a
tribal role in regulating these resources on reservation lands on the basis of tribal sover-
eignty. As discussed above, however, given recent Supreme Court attitudes toward tribal
regulatory jurisdiction, tribal sovereignty alone provides an uncertain foundation for tribal
regulation of nonmember activities with respect to paleontological resources on nonmem-
ber lands. See supra notes 350-374 and accompanying text.
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part of assimilating Native Americans into "American" culture,4 59 Na-
tive American beliefs and practices have survived and flourished.16 °
Thus, to the extent Native American beliefs regarding the land and
the elements that compose it are respected through the protection of
tribal interests in paleontological resources, the exercise of living reli-
gions is protected. The protection of Native American religious tradi-
tions through federal legislation that would ensure a tribal role in the
regulation of paleontological resources on all reservation lands is con-
sistent with the government's trust responsibilities. Moreover, such
protection is consistent with the commitment to the free exercise of
religion embodied in the First Amendment 1-a right that long has
been denied to Native Americans." 2 Finally, providing protection to
Native American religious traditions promotes their preservation as an
element of American cultural and religious diversity." 3
For Native Americans, the cultural and religious significance of
the land and fossils suggests that tribes may have a greater compe-
tence for protecting these resources than do other governmental enti-
ties or private organizations. To the extent that tribes regard
459. The federal government, for example, supported the proselytizing activities of
Christian missionaries almost from the beginning of federal Indian policy. LAWRENCE C.
KELLY, THE ASSAULT ON ASSIMILATION: JOHN COLLIER AND THE ORIGINS OF INDIAN POLICY
RE'oRM 300 (1983). The government also banned particular religious ceremonies, includ-
ing ceremonial dances, which were regarded as immoral or at least as interferences with
agricultural activities. Id. at 301. Government efforts to stamp out the Ghost Dance among
the Sioux led to the massacre of nearly three hundred Sioux men, women, and children at
Wounded Knee, South Dakota, in 1890. LAZARus, supra note 78, at 113-16. As the account
of nineteenth century ethnologist James Mooney explains, "There can be no question that
the pursuit was simply a massacre, where fleeing women, with infants in their arms, were
shot down after resistance had ceased and when almost every warrior was stretched dead or
dying on the ground." James Mooney, The Ghost Dance Religion and the Sioux Outbreak of
1890, in FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT (PART 2) OF THE BUREAU OF ETHNOLOGY TO THE
SMITHSONIAN INSTITIrION, 1892-93, BY J.W. POWELL, DIRECTOR (1896), reprinted as JAMES
MOONEY, THE GHOST DANCE RELIGION AND WOUNDED KNEE 869 (Dover Publications 1973).
460. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
461. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law.., prohibiting
the free exercise [of religion] .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
462. See supra note 459 and accompanying text (describing efforts to destroy Native
American religions). A number of commentators have written about the difficulties faced
by Native Americans in obtaining free exercise protection. See, e.g., Martin C. Loesch, The
First Americans and the "Free"Exercise of Religion, 18 Am. INDIAN L. REv. 313, 314 (1993) (trac-
ing the legal history of Native Americans' struggle for religious freedom); Pemberton,
supra note 110, at 312-17 (describing the courts' failure to protect Indian First Amendment
rights); Jack F. Trope, Protecting Native American Religious Freedom: The Legal, Historical, and
Constitutional Basis for the Proposed Native American Free Exercise of Religion Act, 20 N.Y.U. Rxv.
L. & SOc. CHANGE 373, 374 (1993) (explaining the critical need for legislation to protect
the religious freedom of Native Americans).
463. Robert C. Ward, Comment, The Spirits Wilt Leave: Preventing the Desecration and De-
struction of Native American Sacred Sites on Federal Land, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 795, 831 (1992).
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paleontological resources as having cultural and religious signifi-
cance, rather than as simple inanimate objects to be used solely for
commercial exploitation, tribal governments can be expected to pro-
tect and preserve these resources. In the Black Hills case, for example,
the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe viewed itself as having a responsibility
to protect the fossil taken by BHIGR because of the tribe's role as
stewards of the land.4" Given the dangers posed by the rapid expan-
sion of the commercial fossil market,465 allowing greater control over
paleontological resources by the tribal "stewards of the land" may re-
sult in greater protection of paleontological resources from commer-
cial exploitation.
Just as Congress recognized in ARPA and NAGPRA that human
remains, certain objects, and certain sites have religious and cultural
significance for Native Americans, and that the federal government
was obligated as part of its trust responsibility to respect this signifi-
cance, Congress also should recognize that the land and the fossils
therein have special significance for Native Americans and that tribes
must play a role in protecting fossils on reservation lands.
b. Combatting Imperial Paleontology-The history of en-
counters between Native Americans and paleontologists and other
scientists described in Part II1466 indicates a systematic disregard for
tribal sovereignty and treaty rights. As a general rule, paleontologists
sought to take fossils from tribal lands as surreptitiously as possible
and to avoid direct dealings with Indians unless such dealings could
be useful, such as for obtaining information on the location of fos-
sils.46 7 Even Marsh, who established a personal relationship with the
Sioux leader Red Cloud, seems to have helped gain a public audience
for Red Cloud's grievances because doing so was the quid pro quo for
permission to excavate on Sioux lands.' 8 BHIGR's behavior in the
Black Hills case shows that paleontologists' failure to consider tribal
sovereignty when collecting fossils within the boundaries of tribal ter-
ritory is not merely a nineteenth century phenomenon. Moreover,
although BHIGR provided some compensation to Maurice Williams,
464. Pasternak, supra note 19, at Al.
465. See, e.g., Lazerwitz, supra note 11, at 602; James Coates, Fossil Finders Make No Bones
About Profits, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Nov. 7, 1991, at A10; Pasternak, supra note 19, at Al.
466. See supra part III; see also Riding In, supra note 290 (describing imperial
archaeology).
467. See, e.g., supra notes 233-238 and accompanying text (describing Marsh's use of
Pawnee guides).
468. See supra notes 241-255 and accompanying text (describing Red Cloud and Marsh).
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the $5000 offered was quite small in comparison to the value of the
fossil, which experts estimate to be worth several million dollars.469
This history also shows the role played by the federal government,
despite its treaty obligations and trust responsibilities, in the removal
of paleontological resources from tribal lands. In some cases, the col-
lectors were participants in government-sponsored scientific expedi-
tions. In other instances, federal military authorities provided
protection for, and participated in, the collecting activities.471  The
government even obtained some of the fossils that were discovered for
its own collections. 472 This behavior, too, demonstrated disregard for
tribal sovereignty, despite treaty obligations 473  and trust
responsibilities.4 7 4
This history is similar to the history of the dealings between Na-
tive Americans and archaeologists. Native American graves were dese-
crated and human remains, archaeological artifacts, and other items
were plundered without regard for tribal sovereignty, treaty rights, or
religious beliefs.475 Moreover, the federal government played an im-
portant role in the desecration and plunder.476 Finally, it is worth
noting that in certain instances, paleontologists themselves collected
human remains along with fossils.477 Apparently, at least some pale-
ontologists regarded the desecration of Native American graves as no
different from the excavation and removal of fossils.
The history of the desecration of Native American graves and the
plundering of Native American archaeological resources and cultural
items demonstrated the need for the protection of Native American
remains and other items that is embodied in ARPA and NAGPRA.
Similarly, the history of fossil collecting on reservation lands from the
nineteenth century to the present demonstrates the need to protect
469. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (describing the compensation for and the
value of the fossil).
470. See, e.g., supra notes 207-222 and accompanying text.
471. See supra notes 231-235 and accompanying text.
472. See supra note 269 and accompanying text. Similarly, in NAGPRA, Congress ex-
empted the Smithsonian Institution from the Act's provisions. See supra note 434.
473. See, e.g., supra note 218 and accompanying text (describing treaty fights).
474. See supra note 67.
475. For a historical overview of Native American encounters with archaeologists, see
generally Riding In, supra note 290.
476. Riding In, supra note 290, at 19-20; Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 424, at 40-41.
In 1868 an order of the U.S. Surgeon General directed army personnel to collect Indian
crania and other body parts for the Army Medical Museum. Over 4000 heads were col-
lected in the next several decades-"from battlefields, burial grounds, POW camps, hospi-
tals, fresh graves, and burial scaffolds around the country." Id.
477. See supra notes 266-267 and accompanying text.
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tribal rights to paleontological resources on reservation lands by en-
suring a tribal role in regulating these resources.
V. CONCLUSION
In the Black Hills case, the Eighth Circuit employed a seemingly
straightforward application of state and federal law to decide owner-
ship rights in a fossil found on Indian land. The court based its analy-
sis on an Anglo-American perspective on the nature of land. In
reaching its decision, the court did not consider the rights and inter-
ests of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe with respect to fossils on its
reservation, the special significance of the land and fossils for Native
Americans, or the history of encounters between paleontologists and
Native Americans. An examination of the Native American perspec-
tive on land and fossils and the historical perspective of nineteenth
century fossil collecting demonstrates the need to recognize a tribal
role in the regulation of paleontological resources on reservation
lands.
Tribes that are interested in establishing a tribal regulatory role
over these resources might claim regulatory authority on the basis of
retained tribal sovereignty and treaty rights. Recent Supreme Court
decisions, however, have created uncertainty over the extent of tribal
regulatory authority over nonmembers on nonmember land based on
retained tribal sovereignty and treaty rights. This ultimately may limit
tribes' ability to establish regulatory authority over paleontological re-
sources on reservation lands. It is thus necessary to consider the possi-
bility of congressional legislation that would guarantee Indian tribes a
role in the regulation of paleontological resources on reservation
land. The significance of the land and fossils in traditional Native
American thought and the history of the taking of fossils from tribal
lands indicate that it would be appropriate for Congress to guarantee
a tribal role in this area, as it has already done with Native American
human remains and cultural objects.
Moreover, the history of fossil collecting on tribal lands, both in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, demonstrates that fossil col-
lecting can be viewed as simply another area in which tribal rights
have been disregarded, with the active assistance of the federal gov-
emnment. In the nineteenth century, Native American rights and in-
terests were subordinated to white interests on the "paleontological
frontier," much as they were on the frontier in general. Just as the
federal government ultimately subordinated Native American rights
and interests to the demands of white people who were eager to ac-
quire land and minerals, the federal government subordinated tribal
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rights and religious beliefs to the interests of white paleontologists
and other scientists. Whether the federal government will address this
aspect of the continuing conquest of Native Americans remains an
open question.
